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CHAPTER I 
T".t!E PROBLEM Mm DEFINITIONS OF TEBMS USED 
1. Statement of the Problem 
One who discusses any subject has the right to ma~e certain presup -
positions . It is the r i ght of any one who discus se s religious belief to 
presuppose that it i s dealing with something that exists in h~ experi-
ence which u sually brings value to its participant s.l Just how one shall 
interpret these experiences is the point over whi ch there has been much 
controversy , especially in recent phi losophy . 
A further presupposition of religious belief i s the fact that lQ1ow-
le dge i s poss i ble. Complete skept icism is self-contradictory. However, 
just how certain knowledge may become is a.11other problem which is of con-
cern to recent philosophy. 
Among the dominant views that have challenged the traditional 
claims of religious beli ef in r ecent thought is natural i sm in one or another 
of its many forms. This type of thirucing is concerned with strict adhe r-
ence to the f act s as known t o science and to logic as it is known to phi l os-
ophy.2 The application of this method to religious belief, since it re-
ject s all t heological concepts as 11 irrelevant 11 3 to the fie ld of study and 
the reality of value as not capable of observation,4 is obviously detrimen-
tal in its effect . 
The uroblem of this thesis, then, is to investigate t he accuracy of 
--------~~~~ 1. :Brightman, RV, 15. See -bibliography for explanation of t h is and 
al l following abbrevia~ions. 
2 . Winn, Ar t. (1943) in Runes, (e d .) TCP, 523. 
3· Loc. cit. 
4. Ibi d.' 524. 
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this charge, and to refute it by an investigation of the facts and an ad-
herence to logic. The aim wil l be to show that there are logical bases 
upon which religious belief is founded and is dependent for its very exis-
tence. 
2. Definitions of Terms Used 
It is advisable at the outset of any investigation to have a clear 
understanding of the terms to be used if the field of study is to be clearl~ 
located. The order in which these terms are defined has been chosen with 
the aim of a clear and progressive m1derstanding of the tit le and subject 
about to be discussed. The title is: The Logical Bases of Religious Belie] 
As Treated in Recent Philosophical Thought. 
i. Logic. An understanding of the term 11 logic 11 is needed at the 
outset. Logic has been generally defi ned as the science of thought, or a s 
the science which is concerned with the discovery and formulation of the 
laws of correct or true thinking. The following illustrates this type of 
definition: 11 (Logic) is the intellectual activity by means of which know-
ledge is obtained, the science which t reats of the operations of the human 
mind in its search for truth.~5 However, a brief investigation into the 
history of logic is advisable if a thorough understanding is to be gained 
of recent interpretations. 
The discovery of logic by Aristotle is perhaps his greatest achieve-
ment. His conception of the function of logic is that it describes the meth 
od of reaching knowledge, and is an important instrument for the acquisition 
of genuine knowledge. However, Aristotle hoped for too much from demonstra-
tion binding it by the use of the syllogism to the consideration of quality 
ana. formal essence, impeding the attempt to give experience the degree of 
5· Creighton and Smart, AIL, 3· 
2 
intelligibility of which it allows.6 
As was later demonstrated formal truth and material truth are two 
very distinct things. The development of inductive logic was a great ad-
vance. Inductive logic is the study of actual facts of experience to the 
discovery of universal causal laws, bringing thought into contact with 
reality as merely deductive logic fails to do.7 
• 
Logical theory, from Descartes to the present, however, has been 
concerned with the logic of truth. Thought has been regarded as an "organi 
living function or activity, which remains identical with itself throughout 
all its developing forms and phases. n8 Hegel thought of logi c as the soul 
of the philo sophical system, and even identified it with metaphysics. Hore 
recently, however, the "operational" logic of John Dewey has confined all 
logical forms to the operatiom of controlled inquiry.9 All thinking is 
thus directional, pragmatic, prob lem-solving. 
Professor Edgar s. Brightman points out the dangers of the current 
types of logic for present day idealism, when he says the following: 
I t [ idealism] must avoid the fallacies of the exclusively 
organic theory of internal relations advocated by certain 
idealists; the one-sided and incomplete mathematical-
relational analytic logic of neo-rea1ism; and the irration-
alism of pragmati sm.lO 
With this brief discussion of the history and scope of logic, it 
is at once clear that the field is a broad one. Obviously, it will be 
necessary to narrow the concept to a working definition for the present , 
6. Robin, GTOSS, 258 . 
7. Brightman, ITP, 33· 
8. Creighton and Smart, op.cit., 39· 
9· Dewey, LOG, 3-4. 
10. Brightman, POI, 207. 
3 
discussion. Logic, then, as the term shall be used in this thesis, is the 
process by which the mind reaches true conceptions of reality (as contrast 
ed with mere formal validity) by a coherent ordering of all the facts of ex-
perience. Such a definition, the present writer believes, avoids the dan-
gers, on the one hand, of confusing logic with the metaphysical, and, on the 
other hand, of so limiting it that it is not relevant to the facts of 
experience. 
ii . Religion and God. In defining religion, it is necessary for an 
understanding of the essentials, to construct a descriptive or working def-
inition. Descriptively, religion may be defined as belief in the source of 
experiences which are regarded as of supreme value together with the impli-
cations of that belief. 
Since religion refers to the source of supreme values or to the 
Supreme Reality, and since that Reality has usually been called God, it is 
natural to fol low a definition of religion with a definition of God . 
William Temple said: 11 The heart of reli gion is not an opinion about God ..• 
it is a personal relationship with God. 1111 This duscussion will proceed 
on the premise that God is personal. Although this concept is not univer-
sally accepted, it is, neverthe less, the predominant faith of almost all 
the great re ligions . For if God is less than personal, it is necessary "to 
contemplate the whol l y irrational situation in which God is inferior to 
12 
some finite creatu res. 11 Often this approach is objected to on the 
grounds that it is 11anthropomorphic. 11 However, describing God in the high-
est terms we know leaves open the que sti on whether God is ~than person-
11. Temple , NMG, 103. 
12. Truebl-ood, LOB, 135. For an interesting discussion of this 
problem see Knudson, VRE, 31-37· 
4 
al and reco gnize s the possibi l ity that he may be infinitely more t han we can 
t hink. l3 God, then, may be defined as the Supreme Cosmi c Person , who cre-
ates, sustains and controls all cosmic process for the reali~~li~n_of the 
highest po ssible value. 
iii. Knowledge. Knowledge, a s that term wi ll be used in thi s the-
sis, is defined as sub,jective certaint;r of what is objectively real whi ch 
is achieved by coherent t esting of t he facts of experience a nd made possi 
ble by the att itude of belief. 
iv . Truth. I n this thesis, truth is talcen to refer to that ouali t~ 
of a judgment which exists when t he judgment agrees with the reality to 
which it i s referring. 
v. Eelief. Vitally connected with the entire structure and p r og-
ress of thought in thi s thesis i s the subject of belief. Belief is defined 
as. that unique attitude of the conscious person toward the truth (or falsity) 
of any knowledge claim which i s manifested in a preliminar~ att i tude of u_~­
biased receptivity to the evidence available, and the subseauent attitude 
of corrunitment to that claim. 
3 . Organization of t he Rerrainder of t he Thesis. 
The organization of the remainder of the thesis is based upon the 
l ogi cal structure of the thought examined . There are three main sections. 
Knowledge, including its elements, qualities and motivating p rincipl e , i s 
discussed i n Chapter s II and III. Reli gious Belief, in Chapter IV, is a 
presentation of the view s of four prominent naturalistic or atheistic phil-
osophers and the theistic views of t h ree prominent theisti c philosophers . 
13 . Ib i d . , 136 . 
5 
Chapter~ i s a ~nthesis of t1e two preceding sections into an organic unity 
which, it is hoped , gives evidence for t e logical bases of religious 
belief. 
4. Statement of the Method of Procedure and Sources of Data 
The method of procedure is ~lso a logical one. But it is logical 
in the way logic is above defined. Attention is fi rst given to the general 
concept of knowledge and then an analysis of the knowing process i s u:.rJ.cler-
talcen. The thought of the outstanding exponents of the var·ious e=_Jiste:n0 1og-
ical theories in recent philosophy is inspected and eva uate • The discus-
sion then moves to truth and exponents of the four main criteria of truth 
are given their say. The crl.terion of coherence is accepted and its rela-
tion to the dialecti c is shown. The influence of Hegel is noted in this 
regard. 
That ' nowledge depends upon belief is shown in the cr~ter on that 
subject. A critical analysis is given from the standpoints of logic and 
psychology and a synthetic attitude decide upon . The literature on the 
subject of belief is not extensive. Most of t1e recent di cu · ons of e-
lief either present brief study or combine the subject of belief with anoth-
er relat ed sub ject. D. E. Trueblood in The Lo~ic of Belief presents the 
logical phase of the subject about the best of any recent writer . t he 
is somewhat side-tracked by his desire t o write an introduction t o phi l os-
oph;v of religion as welL . Joh.Yl Laird , in Knowledge, Be ief an Ooinion , 
attempts an exhaustive historical survey, which e does admirab y, but e 
fails to limit his work to the subject of be ief . ,tacintosh is so pre i -
posed n The Problem of Re i gious Knowledge to the historical an epistemo-
logical implications of other men 's thought that he not only misses any 
direct discussion of belief itself. but also f ails adequately to present 
his oWn views systematically. John Dewey 1 s Icgic is a monumental work and 
6 
extremely important i n its exposition of the "operational" viev1 which he 
r epresents. Al though be l ief is given a pla?e, the ch ief concern by far, is 
wi th logic. J.B.Pratt in The Psychology of Religious Belief presents an in-
teresting point of view, but a gain the interest is divided with psychology . 
of religion . ~ne SIDB.ller works , especially F.R. Tennant•s The Nature of Be-
lief, F. C.S.Schiller 1 s Problems of Belief, R.G. ~foilburn , The Logic of Reli-
gious Thought , whi le very interesting and penetrating studies, scarcely do 
justice to the implications of this important but seemingl y neglec ted_ sub-
ject . ~ne art icle on belief in Eastings , ed. , Encvclonedia of Rel i~ion and 
Ethic s by A. 1~air has exceptional value as does that which appears in Ba l d-
win, ed., Dict i onary of Philosophy and Psycho l ogy by J . M.Baldwin. Suffi -
cient truth may be gained from a search of these works to give direction 
and meaning to the concept and to establish its fun damental and rightful 
:place in philosophical thought. 
· T:'1e antithesis to the thesis of lmowl edge and belief is dealt with 
in the chapter on Religious Belief. After an introducto~J section which 
presents the subject of religious be l ief in its proper setting , the thought 
of the four naturali s ts , Bertrand Russell, Roy W. Sellars , John Dewey , and 
Max Otto, i s pre sented and critically analyzed . The three theists, Rudolph 
Otto, Karl Barth , and Edgar S. Br i ghtman are, then, also studied. The aim 
is to disc l ose and evaluate coherently, evidence which will l ead to the solu-
tion of the probl em of the thesis. Russell• s What I :Believe and The Con-
guest of Happiness and Sel l ar s• Evolutiona ry Naturalism, The :rrext Sten in 
Re l igion and The Philosophy of Physi cal Realism, Dewey's The Quest forCer-
tair.ty _@Q. __ }{ax Otto 's The H:u...rnan Enter;pri se form the qiajor bases for the 
discussion of the t hought of t he se men. Rudolph Otto's The I dea of the 
7 
Holy, :Barth 1 s The Word of God and the Word of Man, and Brightman's A Phil-
osophy of Religion, are the works which best represent the thought of the se 
men. 
The writer is indebted to Brightman's An Introduction to Pnilosophy 
for much of the material on epistemology, coherence, and value theory. Al-
so for the discussion of the nature of the self and the interpretation of 
experience the writer is indebted to Brightman's A ~ilosophy of Ideals as 
well as his A Philosophy of Religion. Another source of excellent evidence 
has been D. C. Macintosh's The Problem of Religious Knowledge. It has been 
of great value in connection with critical moni stic epistemology and the 
thought of many of the naturalistic thiru~ers treated. 
The synthesis of the two sect ions on knowledge and belief and re-
ligious belief produces what is called a 11 dialect.ic of religious belief .u 
Knowledge, whi ch is dependent upon the dialectical function in belief, of 
the will of God and ultimate religious certainty in the form of initiation 
. of religious living or normative religion t~~es place. The dialectic here 
used is an adaptation of the 11 dialect ic of desire 11 which Brightman uses in 
A Philosonhy of Religion. Sincere acl~owledgment of the present writer's 
indebtedness to the thought of Professor Brightman is but meagre tribute. 
8 
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CI-:IAPTER I I 
Kl"J'OWLEDG E AUD TRUTH 
1. The Structure of Knowledge 
i . Preliminary Considerations . No person, with the po ssib l e exce9-
tion of th e thoroughgoing skep tic , denies the poss ibility of possessin;§; 
kno v.-led.g e . E-very one understands what it means to know , to have -nowledg e . 
I t is wh en one ane~l ;yzes this idea t hat difficulties are enco"Lmtered. Defi-
ni te i n ste.nces of knowl edge can b e pointed out. The characteristics of 
kn owl edge can be described. But as for kaowledge i tself , it is a prims. ry 
fact of experi ence like the abi lities to see , to fee l , to imagi ne, or to 
v.ri 11.1 
Though there are difficulties i n a nal yzing the idea of knowledge, 
the~r are not nece s sarily insuperable , however . 1~6 st philoso j_ihers are 
a g reed t hat there are three el ements involved i n the knowin::: p r ocess : t h e 
knowi ng subject , the known object , and t h e men tal act of knowing ( cogni -
tion). Th e subject , or knower , . is t h e i ndividual p erson who knows : e . g ., 
"l know t h e book , 11 or 11 The ~ knows his work . " T'n e subjec t , t h en , is a n 
indisp en sib l e element of the idea of knowl e dg e . 
T'n e object, or what is 1-::no\"m , is 11 any thins a nd everythi nt: that is 
or becomes or can be , known b y man . 11 2 Thi s mean s that the objects 9f 
1. :Bitt l e , RM·T , 15 . 
2 . Ibid .. , 16 . 
knowledge can include the knower, or subject, himself and various con-
scious states of his own self, as well as realities-other-than self. ~ne 
precise relationship of the subject and object is a question much dis-
puted, but that every act of knowledge must be a UJmowledge of something" 
and therefore refer to some "object, 11 is perfectly clear, and is dis-outed 
- -
by few if any. 
In the mental act of knowing, the object becomes known to the 
subject. Obviously, this occurs in the subject. The object, before be-
coming known by the knower, exists merely as an 11 object-in-itself. 11 When 
knowing takes place, it become s an 11 object-for-the -mind. 11 It is the re-
lation between the subject and the object in this la:1owing process that . 
present s the chief difficulty in the analysis of la:lowledge. Whatever con-
elusion is reached in this regard, however, it is agreed by all that for 
an object to ·be known, it must be cogniti vely present in the subject in 
the act of knowing. ~ne further discussion of this problem will be pre-
sented later in this chapter. 
If knowledge a~lies to the relation between the subject and the 
object or to the process by which the object becomes cognitively present 
in the subject (by whatever means it may be done), there is, therefore 
the possibility that the object-in-the~1ind or knowledge may not actually 
conform to the object-in-itself or reality. This , then, constitutes 
the quality of truth and error. Truth become s a quality of lmowledge vrhen 
knowledge is expressed in a jud@nent. If the knowledge expressed in a 
judgment actually conforms to the reality of the object lmown, it can be 
10 
' 
said to contain truth. If it does not conform to the object, it con-
tains error. The absence of any judgment or mental assertion or denial 
prevents knowledge of truth or error from arising . But as soon as an 
asserti on is made regarding knowledge, that assertion automatically be-
comes true or false.3 Thus the question of truth is raised. A further 
discussion of this subject and the various criteria of truth wil l be 
made l ater in this chapter. 
There is a third element involved in lcnowledge . Tnis is the 
attitude that may be taken by the subject toward the truth (or falsity) 
of the knowledge he possesses or of any knowledge claim. The lcnowing · 
subject may have complete faith or trust that the knowledge he possesses 
is a true or correct representation of the real object. Or, he nny com-
pletely disbelieve that any knowledge is possible (skepti cism). :Between 
the se extremes of . certainty and skept ici sm, there are rnany degrees of 
belief which are determined. by the amount of truth believed t o exist in 
the knowledge-judgment. The implications of thi s phase of knowledge 
are vital in the development of this entire discussion. Accordingl y , 
they will be treated in a chapter by themselves. 
ii. The Knowing Process . The knowing process , as briefly out-
lined above , may be considered fro m several points of view: dualism, 
idealism, :panobjectivi sm, and cri tical moni stic r ealism. ~1e purpose of 
t h e present discussion is to present as clearly and br iefly a s poss ible 
the salient features of t be se views together with a critici sm of each. 
3· :Bittle, RAM, 18-19. 
11 
Epistemological dualism, briefly , is the t11eory that ho l d s that 
11 every case of knowled.g e includes two elements , idea a nd object , neither 
of which is identified with or can be reduced t o t he other . u4 This doc-
trine has ass'll..rned ir.any rival forms in epistemology . The critical realists , 
for example , hold a view which may briefly be stated as follows : 5 IIPer-
ce-ption may be cal l ed cognitive because of i t s outer reference11 a nd is 
therefore the source of i..plici t knowledge . 6 Th is "outer reference" nru.st 
also be tru.e of 11 1mowledf·e about" as well as of 11 imrnec.iate ex:perience . n 
'l1r uenes s of opinion consists i n confo r mi ty of opinion to the object of 
that opinion . ? The metho ds of judging that opinion a.re merely t he corn-
mon methods of experience a nd reasoning everyone uses . 8 An ideal ist's 
vie'.''l of dua.lism, differing , as would be expecte d, on metaphysical g ro1.mds , 
nevert11eless is quite similar to the reali st epistemolo~·;ically . E . S . 
Erightman 1 s statement is t ypi cal: "The object may be physi cal or mental , 
mathematical or log ical , . .. anything . 11 9 The object is 'never identical with 
the idea of it ; the idea merel y refers to , describes , or , just knows the 
object . lO 
Epistemolo gical dualism, i n one form or another , has been predorn-
i nant in modern philosophy . There have been , however , at certain p eriods , 
strong attempts to find another solution to the 'Jrobl em . These have ·a ..-nh~ ~~ar l 
ed in the fo r m of epistemological mon.i sm mainl y , and hav e c-ome fronL -c e 
4 . Erigbtrl'.an , ITP , 78 . 
5 . Drake , EOR , 
6 . Pra t t , Art . (l920) , 97 . 
7 . Ibid_. , 99 . 
8 . Loc . cit . 
9 . ~rightm£~n, op . cit ., 73 . 
10 . Loc . cit . 
fields of mysticism, idealism and realism. A brief statement of the 
three recent forms of epistemological monism will now be presented. It 
will be followed by a critical discussion. 
The general form of the monistic doctrine holds that knowledge 
is possible because it is "essentially im.rnediate; the idea (experience) 
and the object (that is experienced) are one and the same fact. 1111 The 
"traditional" holders of this view have been idealists, who considered 
the "one" to be idea. Hegel, for example, believed that the Idee, the 
Absolute Idea, subjective and objective, are one and the sa~e. Josiah 
Royce, following Hegel, also entertained a similar conception. 
Among the realists, there has been advocated a different form of 
epistemological monism, namely panobjectivism. It has been SUpPorted 
by some pragmati sts and by some others, particularly of the school of 
neo-realists. Perhaps the stronge st exponent of this recent view is 
R.B. Perry who states, "In ordinary sense experience we are in irrmedi-
ate relation of awareness of presented sensible objects which are cor-
respondingly in the rel ation of immediate givenness. 1112 More simply, the 
theor'J holds that the 11 idea and object are truly one, but t hey are 
object. ul3 
some monists feel that epistemological panobjectivism or the ex-
treme form of monisti c realism, is too do gmatic and uncritical in affirm-
ing that "all the characteri sties of the object as perceive C. belong to 
11. Brightman, op. cit., 75. 
12. 11r.acin tosh, PRK , 3· 
13. Brightman, op. cit., 77. 
it in its independent r eality. 1114 In this group D.C . ~~1acintosh is an 
out standing exponent. He holds, as against the panobjectivists, that 
there should be a distinction between the "qualities which t he object has 
in it s independent reality and q~talities which it has only when perceived 
by us.u15 Reference here is directed to the qualitie s of sight , color , 
smell, t ouch, sound, etc. , which are present in the knower only in t he 
act of perception and in so far as the;>r are perceived there is a "partial 
i dent i ty or overlapping of the i mmediately eA~erienced and the inde9en-
dently real " or the object and the idea. 16 This partial i dentity a lone 
makes verifi cation possible. 
iii . Critical Discussion. In the evaluation of these various 
doctrines, it seems best to follow a more or less historical pattern: 
First, it may be said , the doctrine of dualism in epistemology has not 
been wi t hout diff iculties. Its opponents have not overlooked them either. 
Since the time of Kant, moni srn has been the chief in the 11 revol t against 
dualism, " to u se A. 0. Lovejoy's phrase. 
The epistemological idealists, in order to maintain the theory 
of the Absolute, argued that all experience is included in the conscious-
ness of one Absolute Self, in whom the idea and the object are merged 
into one all-inclusive fact. 17 In answer, to this objection, the dual-
ist answers that this implies a denial of knowledge . Fnow1edge depend 
upon both a knower and an object, but this view ma~es them both one and 
the same fact. It must, therefore, be abandoned. 
14. Macintosh, op. cit., 4. 
15 . Loc . cit • 
16. Ibid. , 6. 
17. Royce, Sfv-;p, 380. 
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The pa nobject i vi st bases hi s objecti ons to dual i sm on a su~posed 
moni sm in sci ence a nd upon the e-nalytic method . Thi s suppo sition , as 
Professor BrightH'.an shows , is incorrect . Science i s really due.listi c e_ncl 
t h is mon. i sm is onl y t heoretica1. 18 F111'thermore , i t has not een even 
clearl y demonst rated that the exclusive use of t h e anal ytic method i s 
a dequate to expl ain t~1e qualities of wholes . 
The critical monist i n sists that epistemological dw11is . is a g-
no stic . D. C. 1\~acil':tos..'h stresses U1is point whenever he can i n _is dis-
cussions of dualism19 a nd " e believes that duali sm can::1ot overcome this 
a rrier . In h is criticism of t:1.e 11 critical reali sts , 11 .e seeks to avoid 
the no s ti cism of their chialistic positi on by seeki ng certainty i n ir.:-
med.iate perce:ption . 20 However , this policy leads him to make statemen ts 
th..at a.re e.ct'Lla.lly argumen ts fo r dualism. Durant Drake , a critical realist , 
a n s;•.rers r.1a cin tosh by saying: 
The chief objec tion to t his theory [ critical monistic realism J 
is tl:.at it assume s the existence of a mysterious ' p sychic' 
creativity at every momen t of percep t i on , a pro cess of which 
have not the sl i.zhtest evidenc e •.• comnl etel y out of lin e 
V!ith every C!.isco;ered a spect of the p;oc ess of perception . 2l 
It might be a dd.ect t hat his a rgument for monism on the basi s of L ... ed1ac;)-~ 
fails to explain either pa st ti .e or to a n swer how there can be a ny 
k:>1owledg e apart f rom some reference to a previous experience . T -e cer-
tainty of mere present experience doe s not constitute lmo·vvledge . It mu.s t 
take the for of the jud;g·men t which make s a claim of truth or error on 
18 . Brightrnan , op . cit ., 32 . 
19 . r.acintosh , POX, Part · I. 
20 . ~acintosh ~ PRK , 6 . 
?.1. Drake , ITP , 170 . 
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the basis of past experience. This past reference cannot be immediate. 
Thus this view has to be abandoned. 
All of these objections to dualism, then , fail to disprove i t . It 
is true that on cualistic p rinciples knowledge seems to l ack certainty . 
The co~lete absence of absolute certainty is granted by any dualist . 
.After all, what is knowledge but just 11 knowing 11 ? To be !.IJ.dentical with" 
is to deny all knowledge and individuality as well. When knowledge of per-
sons is involved, only duali sm avoids an impossible situation l)oth with 
regard to other person s and with regard to the i mplications of self-know-
ledge . Dualism must exist or knowledge is impossible. 22 
Only dualism, also, can give a satisfactory account of the fact 
of error. If the idea and the object are one, how can i dea be inadeauate 
to object?23 Dual i sm has the further advantage of leaving the metaphysi-
cal question open for further investigation, as Professor Brightman re-
marks, "leaving room for minds and their objects whatever they may turn 
b 1124 out to e. 
2. ~1e Nature of Truth 
As has already been stated in Chapter I, truth is that auality 
of a judgment which exists when the judgment agree s with the reality to 
22. Brightman, op. cit., 88 . 
23. Ibi d., 31. 
24. Ibid., 92. 
which it is referring . This d.e finit ion is i n sub stanti !:'.l ::.:.gr eGde~l t ·:fi · ~'l 
·ci:~ os:') t; i 'n". by E. S. Erightrnan, 25 G. W. Cunninghara,26 D. C. Macintosh,27 
and A. K. Rogers. 28 Considerable confusion, however, has arisen over 
the fact that trQth has been given other meanings. For example, truth 
may mean (although rarely used) "that feeling of certainty which accom-
20 
panies a judgment of one who is fully convinced. " ""' Al so , truth has 
been given a substantive meaning which identifies it with reality. Thi s 
use is more common. R. T . Flewelling , who tends in some plac es3° to 
use the word in this way, acknowledges the subjective factor in truth: 
That our truth is but fragmentary and partial is not a 
fault of truth itself; it is due to the limitations 
of the human mind , the incompleteness of that which can 
live only as it changes and moves toward completion.31 
It is advisable , therefore, to be specific as to just what is 
meant when the word truth is used. ]'or this reason, its use has been 
confined in this thesis to its judgment relation , and , when understood 
in t hat relation primarily, i~ s function vd ll become more apparent and 
it s relationship to knowledge more unified. 
i. Criteria of Truth. If, therefore, truth is the quality of 
the judgment that is representative of reality, is there any means that 
25. Ibi d., 34-35· 
26. Cunningham , POP, 115. 
27. Macintosh, PRK, l-2. 
23. Rogers, WIT, 55· 
29. Cunningham, op. cit., 116n. 
30. Cf. Flewelling, OP, 120-123. 
31. Ibi d . , 226. 
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can be used to aid u s in fornung or ident ifying the judgment? Is there 
a criterion that in some way is adapted to the knowing process , reality , 
a n d t h e subject? Various criteria have been tried a nd advoca.ted. It is 
the task of this section to consider the l!'<:'.in ones and to determin e 
wh ich seems the most reliable . 
First to be discussed are th e 11 coromo n-sense11 criteria . I nclud ed 
in this group are the views , individ_.ua.l and group , that are more or less 
uncritically held by t }1e maj ority of the l')eople . The individ1.1.E!.l criteria 
here mea.nt are those of i nsti nct , f eeling , i n tuition , and sen se e rper ience . 
Th e t;roup cri terie. e.re t ho se of custom , tradition , and consensus .=:en ti um.3..'1 
Th ey fall i n to tb.e class tbat W.P . v;on tasue calls ilobjectivism. u34 
T'fl. e crit erion of Corn.rnon-Sen se received philosophic treatment in 
the works of Thomas Reid (1710-1796 ). He h eld t hat knowledg e is ba sed 
upon l')rinciples which are evident and are recognized as such b y the 
CO!Ill1on-sense of man . From t h ese principles , reached t . rough i mmediate i n-
tui t i on , l'l'.an derives a body of prirnorclial truth s of com.rnon- sen se which 
serve as a common fUi"1d for manldncl . 35 
.{ontague criticizes t h e extreme or p rimitive form of this view 
by point i ng out that it fa ils 11 to estinate t h e degree to whic and r:anner 
in which tl1e real di ffe rs from th e <.mrea1. 11 36 Thi s is a basic cri t icism, 
a nd disqualifying to any criterion of truth . 
!v ontague also states t .. at the moderate forms of 11 objecti vis. 11 a re 
Yl eak because the report of t h e object depends not upon the objects th em-
33 : This list is p;i ven by Brig:htrren in ITP , 35 . 
34 . Montague , WK , 239 • 
35 . Bittl e , o:p . cit ., 319 . 
3 6 . , on tat;-ue , o::p . cit • , 245 . 
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selves as experienced, but upon the observer . .. 11his position and general 
condition.n37 This objection refers to the views of intuition, s ense e x-
perience, feeling, and instinct. The criteria of common sense must~ 
therefore be abandoned as unreliable. 
The belief that correspondence holds the key to truth is certain-
ly a natural one to hold, especi ally i f truth is correspondence in accor-
dance with the definition adopted in this thesis. This criterion holds 
a true judgment to be one that "exactly represents, or corresponds to the 
way in which real things are conjoined or divided. n38 
H. H. Joachim's criticism of t his theory is that it "faces the 
problem of the 'mental' and the 'real' factors," which prove s an inade-
quat e process 11 when appli ed to the whol es in question.u39 F . H. Bradley 
claims that the vi ew i s not consistent ':"i th i tself, 11 for h ov; c2n tl-!e past 
cr futu r e can b e cop ied i s a.t l ea st not evic'.ent . n40 The fatal blow, how-
ever, to corresp ondence as a criterion o~ truth is struck by Bradley who 
states that instead of copying the facts of reality, these f acts are 
themselves products of the mind or i deas and cannot be compa.red at all. 41 
Professor Brightman argues with e qual force that the attempt to compare 
my idea vri th the reality is impossible unless both are "immediately cer-
tain and ca.:pable of being compared with each other." Reality, however, 
is not immediate l y certain or directly accessible, as the section on 
knowledge has demonstrated, and the refore comparison is impossib l e . nwe 
37· Montague, op. 
.... 
c:!.". ' 240 . 
38. Joachim, TNT , 7· 
39· Ibid., 29. 
40. Bradl ey , ETR, 107. 
41. Ibi d., 108. 
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can only compare our ideas with other ideas or experiences. u42 The cor-
respondence theory, therefore, as a criterion of truth must be abandoned. 
In recent philosophy, particularly in America, pragmatists have 
advocated practical consequences as a criterion of truth. Wi lliam James 
states: 
Most of the pragmatic and anti-pragmatic warfare is over 
what the word •truth• shall be held to signify, and not 
over any of the facts embodied in truth situations; for 
both pragmatists a..11d anti-pragmatists believe in ex istent 
objects, just as they believe in our ideas of them. The 
difference is that when the pragmatists spea..~ of truth, 
they mean exclusively something about ideas, namely t heir 
wo rkableness; whereas v:hen anti-pragmatists speak of truth 
they seem most often to mean something about the objects.43 
Briefly, then pragmatism holds that the criterion of truth is found in 
practical consequences, in "workableness. 11 
Anothe r characteri stic of pragmati sm, wh ich re sults from the re-
ference to the idea and not the object, is the idea that a judgment is 
"made" true by being verified and apart from its verification it cannot 
pos sse ss the qualities of truth and error . James says 11 truth happens to 
an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact, 
. t . f' t' u44 an event , a process: .•. l s ver1 1ca 1on. Dewey agrees with Jame s 
on this point when he says that "the true means the verified and means 
nothing else.u45 
The main objection to pragmatism s eems to be i ts ambiguity and 
its fai lure to be specific in the meaning of its terms. 1146 There are 
so many inconsistencies in the various forms of pragmatism and so much 
42. Brightman , op. cit., 50 . 
43 . J ame s, !{OT, xi. 
44. James, PRA, 201 . . 
45. 
46. Brightman, op. cit., 55· 
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that is l eft undefined that it i s extremely confusing to t1e earnest 
mind . It r!1i gh t even b e said_ t 1at , to many , pra gr.nati sm has eco .e exceedin . 
l y 11 unworkable11 ~ 
Another ob jection is the fact that u..11. true iclea s may ap:pear to b e 
pract ical. There are ma ny beliefs that yi eld pra ctical results and y et 
a re cor,1:?letel y contradictory to each other . ~l7 
There i s also the fact th..at a n i o.ea rna y both be true and at the 
sar<~e time ) 6 incapaole of verifi cation . Ro~rce , for example , illustrates 
this by saying that "no r ea sonabl e mi n d can doubt that 'the totality of 
the experience of 1rany men real l y exi s t s ; 1 ye t t1is fact would a ppear to 
be beyond the reach of pra.gnatic i nvestigation . u48 
Furthermore , a lthough a s yet unverified, a true statement ma y yet 
exist . For exa 1ple , the judgment that a certain appl e contains see _s is 
made before i nvestigation . Upon iOvestigation , seeds are found a s t~1 e 
judg. ent stated . Certainl y the ·,nagw.atist would no t say that the act of 
i nvesti ,~ a tion a ctually pro duced the seeds? They must have b een i n t here 
at t he tLne of the ju~:ment , and t hat j-c.a'-~ment must have been a true one . 
Aga i n , the i dea that t he only way to lea.rn is through " banging 
on e's h eaa. aga inst t ' .. e wall" is one tbat i s certs.i nly -as t eful of "!lUJiJan 
energ.·y as well as detrimental to hD.ppi ness : human happiness is the oal 
of one type of prac.retism. 49 This would. seem to contradict itself . I t 
woul d certainly be a great dea l T!i0re efficient a nd desirable to the race 
as a w_ ol e if the race could profi t by tl e mistakes of t he pas t as well GIS 
47 . Bradley , op . ci t ., 73 . 
48 . Cited in Bri gh tman , op . cit ., 55 . 
49 . F . C. S . Schiller ' s huma n ist ic :prag;rratism. 
eTperimenting litt~e by little to discover truth. 
Finally, if the pragmat ist is consistent, he must that the day 
may come when belief in absolute truth is the only belief about the na-
ture of truth which works. If truth is absolute then, it must have been 
so all the time.5° Thus, pragmatism is actually self-contradictory and 
must be rejected. 
Up to this point there have been, what the present wr iter be l ieves, 
are valid reasons for rejecting all the proposed criteria of truth thus 
far discussed. The criterion of coherence, advocated by various philo so-
phers from t he time of Plato to the present , remains to be investigated. 
~~e discussion of its claims shall now be undertrucen. 
Coherence may be defined as the criterion of truth that holds an~ 
judgment to be true, 11 if it is both self-consistent and coherently conne ct-
ed with our system of judgw.ents as a whole.n5l In addition, Professor 
Brightman, an eminent exponent of this view, adds that coherence must es-
tablish nexplanatory and interpretative relations between various part s 
of experience which include all known aspects of ex:perience and all 
known problems about experience in its details and as wholes. n52 Also a 
working hypothesis, with constant revision as new experience is gained , 
is nece ssary. 53 
Such a criterion might be called the "logical criterion, 11 inas-
much as it embraces both the de duct i ve method. and the inductive method 
of logic, or the application of the Law of Contradiction (self-consisten-
50. Quoted in Trueblood, LOB, 25. 
51. Brightman , op . cit. , 61 . 
52. Brightman, POR, 128. 
53· Ibid., 28-29. 
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cy) and the Law of I den ti ty (external coher ence) . 54 It might a,l so be 
called the :purely philosophic method. or criterion because it co!'!lb i ne s the 
analytic- synthetic method with the synopti c method a.nd t hereby concerns 
itself with the qualities of part s and al ~o the q_uali ties of wholes . 
Coherence is ea sily appli cable to a du_ali stic epi stel!lology , which 
earlier i n this discus sion wa s sho,,vn to be the onl y reasonable view . Co-
herence :presuppo ses that t h e 1h'1iverse of reality is a universe of order . 
If t hi s were no t so , it would be u sel es s to attempt any investi gation 
w.atever or to formulate any criterion of truth , By appeali ng t o coherence 
the difficulties of th e previous views are reso l ved . It reco €,11i ze s tl e 
trut.h and avoids the difficulties of each . 55 In f act , a s Professor Brigh t 
man puts it, coherence 11 cannot be deni ed without being affirmed . 11 56 De-
nial means appeal to some form of coherence or else to contradiction a nd 
incoherence , in f act , it 11 • s acb.1ally employed by every one , in so far 
as __ e thinks seriously . 11 51 
There have been object i ons to the criterion here explained. .j'any 
of them have resulted from a mi slmderstandi ng of all that it really 
means . Some criti cs restrict it to consistency and nothing more . Others 
interpr e t on l y i ts logice.l and factual consistency . All of these incom-
p l ete v iews of the theory are unjust to the view as presented by Bri ght-
rm.n . 
The mos t serious objection to coherenc e i s the statement ·that 
con e renee l eacls only to rel ative truth , t'b.at in the light of f uture 
necessary revisions , our present views a r e not t ruth but error . This is 
54 . Bri gh tman , ITP , 59 . 
55 . Ibid., 66 . 
5 6 . Ioid., 65 . 
57 . Ibid. , 66 . 
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the substance of Bertrand Russell ' s criticism of the coherence t _ eory as 
held by Joachi m, for whom nothing short of the Ab solu te is tru th . Rt:tssell 
asks! Is the tl1eory itself being not the whole of knowledg e , wholl y true~59 
This objection is answere d b~r Brightman who replies that no criteTion can 
avoid the fact that 11 we know in part . 1159 But this do es not mean that our 
"presen t stage of knowledg e is worthless and. 1.m true • .. • It is simply a less 
coherent view . H60 
Thus the mo st sc.tisfactory criterioa of truth bas in this discus-
sion been found to be coherence . As a criterion it is not something 
static , but something developing : a tool to e;_1ab l e u.s to ri gh tly judg e 
ou.r erperience . 'Nhen it is used, and only then , \'lil1 our knowledg e be-
co me a t rue and valid represente. t ion of reality within our mi nds . 
ii. T'ne Dialectic . Althou.gh this thesi s is a di scu.ssion limi ted 
to recent philosophy , it seems adv~sable to ~resent a brief eX9osition 
of a very i mportant influ.ence that stems from modern philosophy , viz ., 
the dialectic as developed_ by Heg el. Recen t reli gious t h inkers of as 
different belief s as Royce, Brightman , a nd K . Barth have been debtor to 
this idea . j1or purposes of this discussion , therefore , it is a dvisab l e , 
at this ~JO i !l t , to ex&.mine brief1y t~1e dialectic both in its relation to 
t he ~revious conclu sions of this t h esis and to :!J:r:epare for what is to 
follow . 
Regel's conce))tion of the dialectic is organically connected 
58 . Ru ssell , PE , 150 ~ 
59 . Brightrran, ITP , 34 . 
60 . Loc . cit. 
with his entire phi losophy . However, the interest of the present discus -
sion i s confined to the structure and importance of the d.ialectic i t sel f. 
The dialectic is a process, a logical p rocess of thought by which an i dea 
or "notion n passes through the stages of thesis , antithesis , and synthesi s. 
As Hegel puts it: 
Experience is called t his very process by which the element 
that is i mmedia te, unexperienced, i.e. abstract--whether it 
be in the form of sense or of bare thought [ thesi s ] --exter-
nalizes itself, [ antithesis1 and then comes back to itsel f 
from thi s stage of estrang~ment, and by so doing is at length 
set forth in its concrete nature and real truth6Ind becomes t oo a possession of consciousness [ synthesis ] . 
The thesis is any starting point , any i dea or experience. 62 This begin-
ning or "notion" carries with it "the process of its own dissolution , n63 
or t he antithesis , which p rovide s the vitalizing power of t he dialectic. 
The tension thus beg~.m sets up an interrelating of the moments " i n such a 
way a s t o b r ealc down the opposit ion and connect the one with the other," 
64 
establi shing an "explicit union between them ," or synthesis . To Hegel, 
t h is is the proces s of thought, the p r ocess by which the "real contrariety 
65 
of moments in a notion which are negatively oppose d to each other 11 . i s 
brought into h ar monious unity, thus r evea ling his dictum: "The truth is 
66 the whole." He constantly advances to new truth from which to embark 
again on t he endless quest for the "who l e ." 
Tnat the di alectic i s not to be abstracted fr om living expe r ience 
61. Regel, HS, 31-32. 
62. Ibid., 38. 
63. I bid., 50 . 
64 . Bailli e , Ai' L L ;:,~; ) , 580 . 
65 . J;.oc . ci t . 
66. Hegel, op . cit., 16. 
is pointed out by Hegel 1 s statement that 11When dial ectic ••• "has been sep-
arated from t he proof, the idea of philosophical demonstration as a matter 
of fact vanishes altogether. 1167 Instead, it is to be thougr1.t of as a 
bu which "disappears when the blossom breaks through ••• in the same way 
when the fruit comes 11 the stages are not me re ly sel·arate, they do not 
mere y fai l to contradict one another , but each is 11as necessary as the 
other; and this equal necessity of all moments consti t utes from the out-
set the ife of the who l e . n68 
iii. Summary of the Chapter . Summarizing the concl usions reac _ed 
in the discussion at this point , it may be said that: 1. Knowle ge i s de-
pendent upon a knower , an object l~own, and a process of knowing. 2. No 
know edge is possible unless a judgment is made in the form of an a s ser-
tion or a denial regarding the ob j ect known by the ln1ower , and that judg-
ment consequently may be true or false depending upon its correspondence 
to the actual object itself. 3· The actual ob ject a~d the idea repre-
senting it which the k.aowe r possesses are at all times two distinct en-
t ities . 4. The only criterion which appears to be adapted satisfac-
torily to the process of sifting the true f rom the erroneous judgments 
is co he renee. 
The relation of t he dialectic to coherence can now be seen as the 
means by which the mind el iminates the negative moments from a judgment 
claiming to be a true one . Internal l y , or deductively, logically speak-
ing, the dialectic eliminates i nconsistencies and establishes 11expl anatory 
67 . Hegel , op . cit., 59· 
68. See ib id., 2-3· 
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and interpretative relations between the various parts of experience." as 
was mentioned previously. Externally, or inductively spe~ting , the dialec-
tic functions creat ively in constantly revising hypotheses as new experi-
ence is gained. The dialectic thus plays a dual role in the living expeT-
ience of personality. Coherence is not equivalent with the dialectic but 
coherence uses the dialectic in its search for the true. It is with this 
in mind that the further discussion of Belief in general , andRe igious 
Belief in particular, will be carried on. 
CHAPTER II I 
BELIEF 
1. Preliminary Discussion 
i. Restatement of the Definit ion. As has been indicated previous-
l y , this chapter will be devoted to the discussion of the atti tude of the 
mind toward the truth or falsity) of any knowl edge claim. It is advi s-
able , therefore , to restate the definition of belief whi ch was given in 
Chapter I. Belief is defined as t hat unique a ttitude of t he conscious ner-
son toward the truth (or falsity) of any knowledge claim which is manifes-
ted in a preliminary attitude of unbiased recept ivi ty to the evidence 
available. and the subsequent attitude of commitment to that claim. 
Whi le this discu ssion · wi l l concern itself wi t h several meanings 
of belief, by far the major emphasis shall be placed upon the psycholog-
ical as above defined. Thus it will not be necessary to devise new ter-
minology in order to maintain clarity. However, as the definition above 
a 9-opted indicates , the words "unbiased receptivi ty" and "commitment " 
shall be used separately from time to time t o indicate the t wo phases of 
belief which the writer believes exi st as indicated by this stuqy. 
ii . Belief and Knowledge. The relationship of belief to know-
ledge is profitably discussed at t h i s point as a means of uniting the con-
clusions of the previous chapter with the thesis of t he present one. 
It will be recalled that the duality of the object and the idea 
2.8 
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or e:h"})erience w .ich claims to b e rep resen tative of t. e ob jec t has b een 
shovm . Furth er , no knowledg·e at all can exist U:flless a judg! ent is ;::.a .e 
r·ega rding that idea or experience asserting or denying the truth (or 
f al ity ) of its claim . How , it is precisely at the point of j udgment that 
belief enters the situation . G. F . Stout , as Mair ob s erves , has attemp-
ted to identi fy belief wi th judg ent , calling this state 111 t h e Ye s- .. ro con-
sci olJ.sne ss . t lll But Baldwin a nd fair ri g:h tly prefer to differei1tia te th e 
two, ma k i ng t:1e judgment t h e log ical side a nd elief the subjective or 
:p sychological side of the same state of mind . • As shall presen tly be seen , 
t hese two factors a re vi tall y and i n terdeyJendentl y connected . 
iii. Belief a nd Truth . Objec t i v ely speaking , that is , from t~ e 
standpoint of the object , or Hmatters of factH , as Trueblood put s it , the 
a r e n two odes of truth : truth and f'alsit;y . 11 2 Subjectively , hov1ever , and 
this is from t he s t a ndpo int of belief a -:1 d , we may say , the only a ccessi-
ble s tandpoint , as the previ ous discussion of the correspondence c r iteri-
on r...a s shovm , truth m:1y va ry b etween the doubtfu l a nd the certain . This 
idea win be furth er arnplified la t er in the chapter . ·!.a tters of f act , the 
a re fixed; bel iefs ~ay chang e . 
i v . A pproac e s to Belief . There seems to be agreemen t a :nong re-
cent philo sophers who hav e treated. this subj ect that belief lies in the 
g en eralloca.lity of logic a nd psyc _ol ogy . Schiller says that t 1e subject 
is 11 capable of treatnent by either , but i ncapable of sub jection to either 
· .. • !Jnly the co-or-erati on of both can reduce it to order . ,3 This view 
1 e: · 1' t (1 928) :-4 ""0 . ·'-alr , .... r . , o~ .• 
2 . Trueblood , LOB , 33 . 
3 . Sc~iller , P GB , 9 . 
30 . 
e.g rees su1J stantially with that held by Tennant who is bo t hered by the a rn-
big ui ty which is caused by the demands of the two field.s . Logi c , Tenna n t 
observes , is concerned wi th b elief 11 solel y in the s ense of W~!.at is believed 
... in a straction from believers ; their g roLmds and their truth ; with vhat 
ou.crht to be believeo. and •~·hy. 11 4 Psychology , on the other hand , 11 can only 
treat of elief in the sense of bel iev..i!lg , which is a Hental state in one 
or more persons . 11 5 Sc;hi1ler puts it t his way : Logic asks the question , 
II • , 1111 • 1 II • ,, I ~ at · ls it wort.:1'!' P sycho Of?.Y ask s , How did it come to be? The quest1on , How 
d • t • • 1 ""'f ... h t' ?
11 
• t ' t -+' b .._h 
.o 1 s or1 g1n an va ue a .1 ec v eac. o ner :Ls one n.a · comes .1. ro a o" a n d 
tl eir relati ons . 6 
There is , however , a further :point to be empha.sized l1ere . It is 
the :Present wri ter 1 s observa tion that both lo ~:ic and p sycho l ogy are .ill!,a-
l •rtic a nd aim to reduce t h eir sub ject t o its constituent r;art s. In so f ar 
as t h ey are sciences t h is is a n acce:9ted. occurrence . However , in relation 
to t:he definition o:: 1)elief vihich holds belief t o be a -positive attitude- -
so;·,Jet:"1ing tha.t is 11 life- giving , 11 as it were , it seems advisaole to search 
for a n a pproe.ch to belief that is more than a naly tic only. This , it is be-
lieved 1)y the pre sent writer , i"s fou..Tld in a synthetic a:pproa ch which is 
po si tive and not merel y negative : t he dialectic which has al rea dy been des-
cribed. a nd which po ssesses the natural affinity to li fe de si red while not 
forsaki ng the at tributes of lo.:dc also desired_. I t is in thi s S~)iri t that 
the discu.ssion moves to the f a ctors of l)elief . 
4 . Ten;1ant , NOB , 4 . 
5 . I bict., 4 , 5 . 
6 . Schiller , op . cit ., 9-10 . 
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2 . Factors in Belief 
i . Consci ous Person . The need of a conscious subject has b een 
shown in Chapter II . 7r:hether or not the subject must be a person in order 
to h..:we any lmowledge is a natter of debate a nd is not a co ncern of the 
present discussion . Here the interest is with the 11 logical11 bases of eli ef . 
Th e real problem rre.y be stated as whether or not the subject must be person-
al i n order to possess 11 logical capa.ci ty . 11 Professor :Brigh tman states that 
the person , in contrast with the minimmu self , in a ddition to the higher 
development of the traits of the minimum self, has certain 11 emergen t traits 
• .. of which the most important are th e consciousness of imperative norms , 
freedom and reason.'17 It is evident , that for belief to be logical t h e sub-
ject mtJ.st have t he capaci t 3r to be consci ous of logical obli ga tions a nd be 
free to act upon t heir reasonecl i mplications . Theref ore , the con sciou s -p er-
son must be what is mean t by t he conscious subject for t h e purpo ses of t his 
discu ssion at least . 
ii. Present E:x:perience . Avoic:ling t he controversial a nd irrelevan t 
question as to whether experience is necessary i n order to have a :per son 
or VL et..."l-J.er the person is necessar;:,r in order to have experience , it may be 
safel;:,r s"W~ted tha t experi ence is necessary to belief . Experience furnishes 
the raw rrP. terial fro m which ou..r beli ef s may be constructed. Hel pful f'-t t h i s 
point is Bri ghtman's distinction b etween 11Situa.tions Experienced and Situa-
tions Believe o.- in ." He states : 
7 . :Brightrne.n , FOR , 352-353. 
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The only Situation Experienced by anyone is his own conscious-
nes s . .. The only basis we have for any knowl edge , belief , faith, 
t ruth , or error , is to b e found in Situations E:>q>erienced . \!:hat-
ever is not in the Si ~ua tion Experienced i s a Si t uation Believed-
in or Disbelieved~ in . . · 
This present experience is si mi l ar9 to ma n;>r concepts held i n recent p..'l').ilo-
so:p y , for example , .Janes's 11 streCjl!l of consciousness, 11 Royce's 11 span of con-
sciousne ss , 11 t .. e 11 specious -pre sent , 11 Brightll'an 1 s 11 Cl.atun1 self, 11 and others . 
The importan t point to e gathered from these concept s is th..at a 11 mere .. o-
mentary da.tur.'l is almo st i ncorrro.rehensibl e . 1110 Brightman lays stre'i'S on t h e 
time- transcending a nd self- trariscendi nt; ability of the mind . The for:.1er , b;)r 
t e u se of nernory and fl...:O ticipa.tion unites t he past ti th the p resent and t he 
present with the fut re r es:;ectively . Wi thout t his ability the mi nd would 
co mpletely lose i ts m1ity . ll The l atter 
necessarily explains itself as presen t dat um by referring beyond 
that mere datm~self to something whic . tra~scends it . .. Thus 
present con sciousn ess i mplies that other consci ousness has and 
will be ·actual , and t1at t h ere is a worlo_ i n relation tow ich 
I stana . l2 · 
It is this latter or self--tran sc ending ability of the mi nd Lat is the o -
ject of the pre sent discussion . 
iii . Environmen t . If the vie above de scribed is correct , and t .e 
situatiml believed- i n is 11 whatever is not11 :9resent consciou sness , it is at 
once obvious how ex tremel;ir i r:1:9ortan t and crucial tl1e subject of eli ef ac-
tur;.1l;;r h:.:'-s become . It is custom«:w~.r by eX!,Jonents of this view to give t he 
na~ne 11emrironment11 to everything except the actual present experience i tself . 
8 . Brit·h t rran , POR , 347-348 . 
9 . As Bright rnan observes , ibid., 348n- 349n . 
10 . ri~n tman, POI , 20- 21 . 
11 . Ib id., 21-22 . 
12 . toe . cit . 
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This v:ouJ.c include all :past experience , e.s well as f u ture , the biolog i cal, 
~-hysical a nd social environments , t he subcon sci ous , los ical a nc i .. eal en-
tities , a nd t1e meta:pbysical realm.13 Thus all o jects of b elief o ri .~ina.te 
i n one or more of these r ·ealms or t 1:e 11 actue.l 11 environmen t 15 r so it een·s. 
iv . Jud.g ent or Knowledt;s e- Clai J . The previous discussion of .. onism 
versus du"".lism has concluded th at the real object and. the id.ea or ex-~aerience 
of it ce.n never b e the sEJ:rne thing . On this basis e::Qerience and environmen t 
_ave been divi ded .• Thus it follo ws that l)eliefs actue.lly cannot originate 
in the real environmen t but in tLe experienced environ ent . But th ere is 
one more proolem . There uust be formulated a juclgme_11.t from the basis of ex-
perience t ha t i nfers the existence of the envi ronmen t , and which expresses 
t he expectation or opinion of the p erson as to what is actu.ally ou tside h is 
own con sciousness . This concept compares with the "preliminary synopsi s11 of 
Brigh t ma nl 4 and the 11 working h y-pothesi s11 of Jevons.l5 
SunllT:arizi:ng , then , the environment i nclu.des everytlj.ing which is not 
i ncl uded in :presen t eA~erienc e. s such it is an object of belief . But by 
bein;5; an ob ject of b elief it becomes 11 :psycho l ogical 11 instead of 11 a ctua.l 11 16 
b ecause of the time an d self- tra.nscending natu re o"" the mi nd a na. because t l:. e 
conchJ.sion s of t at transcendence rrrust be formulated a nd relat ec'l. coheren tly 
with the whole • 
. v . Pre-investi t::a tion A ttitude . At this point in the c'l.iscu.ssion. it 
has ecome time to discuss t~e first :phase of t h e at titude of b elief as it 
13 . 
14 . 
15 . 
16 . 
Bright1nan , POR , 359- 360 . 
bid., 117 . 1 
Cited by Tennant , PT , Vol. I , 271. / 
This dis t i nction is ma de by Bertocci .i n A.rt .(l945~__j 
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has been previously defined, namely, as the attitude taken toward the judg-
ment or knowledge-claim. There may be two attitudes taken at this point: 1 . 
adoption of an attitude of Willingness to accept evidence for and against 
the truth of the judgment in question, or, 2. adoption of an ~willingness 
to accept evidence fo r and against the truth of the judgment in quest ion. 
The two attitudes wi ll be discussed in i~verse order. 17 
1) Commitment Without Testing of Evidence. The attitude of 
credulity can be said, perhaps, to mean the opposite of belief, as defined 
above , since belief includes an attitude of willingness to listen to all 
the evidence . By credulity is meant an attitude of 11uninterestedness" 
which "does not care" to consider the evidence fairly. Though negative 
to belief, i t is, nevertheless, positive in i ts assertion. It is usual ly 
expressed in either of two forms: 1. The j udgment does conform to reality 
and therefore is true, or, 2. The judgment doe s not conform to reality and 
the re f ore is not true. Both conclusions represent a dogmatic and prema-
ture finality. 
Laird observes that largely to blame for this attitude are senti-
mental appeals in so far as they "inhibit attention to what is distasteful 
and troublesome by producing a natural inertia which make one reluctant to 
admit, and even to examine fresh evidence. n18 
Tennant's discussion in NOB cites two completely "subjective cau-
ses of beliefll--desire and aversion and also association. These attitudes, 
it seems,require no evidence and in the present discussion may be cal led 
ca:Uses of creduious belief. '1\nmt also lists inductive method and :fnr types 
17. See Lairc1., !CEO, 155, for support for this position. 
13. Lo c. cit. 
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of authority: parental (and pedagogic), ·psychological atmosphere and public 
opinion, testimony , and suggestion, which he states are "objective and sub-
j ect i ve 11 causes of belief. However, it may be said here that any of t ese 
factors may lead to a true belief QK to a false one , but if any are taken 
alone to the rejection of any of the others , the attitude of credulity ex-
ists. The person who takes this attitude of closing his eyes literally 
11 cut s himself loose 11 from existence ano. says, 11Goodbye 11 to others, the world, 
and even to himself (if he is consistent ) si nce it is only by evidence or 
experience that he can know ~rthing about any of them. If and when new evi -
dence comes , as it wil l , it becomes a disintegrating factor within his 
personality. 
2 Unbiased Receptivity. The adoption of the attitude of un-
biased receptivity is the beginning of belief, true belief. It is no t a pas-
si ve atti.tude, but is an active, dynamic one. This frame of mind i s simi l ar 
t o faith when that very ambiguous word i s defined as 11 trust 11 in that which 
is not yet apparent. Bosley, in The Quest for Religious Certainty, adopts 
the term "tentativeness" for this atti tude. :But thi s emphasizes too strongly 
the negative aspect of the concept. To be ready to receive truth re~uires 
an unqualified submission--a complete abandonment of all prepossessions com-
bined with a forward look ing attitude . Schiller ap:;>roaches this idea when 
he calls belief "a spiritual attitude of welcome. n19 This welcome to new 
evidence instead of bringing disintegration, brings integration vnthin the 
personality of his entire consciousness since no evidence is consciously 
disregarded. 
19. Schi ller, POE , 14. 
vi. Investigation. It can be seen from the foregoing discussion 
that investigation becomes a factor i n belief only when the attitude of un-
biased receptivity is adopt~d. The aim of investigation , then, is to ascer-
tain the truth or degree of truth (or falsity ) of the original judgment by 
the process of gathering and testing the evidence, in a word, i ts verifica-
tion. 
1) Evidence. Before any process of veri ficat ion can begin 
t here must be a process of gathering all the evidence available. Generall y , 
this is accomplished by the sciences whose aim is to describe e:xperience. 
From the point of view of this duscussion, however, evidence may consist of 
either situations experienced or situations believed-in. However, since all 
situations believed-in refer to situations experienced and the aim of inves-
tigation is to find the basis for situations believed in, it follows that 
all investigation must begin and end in the data of the present experience 
of an investigating person. 20 
2) Application of the Criterion. After the evidence has 
been gathered for and against the hypothesi s , the criteri on must be chosen 
and used. The criterion is the means used to distinguish truth from error. 
This subject has been previously discussed and reasons have been gi ven, con-
elusive ones it is hoped, f or accepting the criterion of coherence. Refer-
ence to pages 22- 3 of this thesis wil show the steps involved in coherent 
pro cedure. When the steps involved are related to the elements thus f ar 
found to exist in belief, the fol owing points emerge: 
20. See Brightman, Art.(l931)~ Also for a unique analysis of tbe 
factors involved within any conscious experience see his FOR, 319-321. 
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1. The conscious person is necessary for coherence to be possible 
since on y persons are capable of reason. 
2. Present experience fo~s the ultimate basis or raw material for 
coherence. 
}. The aim of coherence is a tr~e estimate of the environment. 
4. Also necessary to coherence is a preliminary synopsis or hypothe-
sis as a starting point. 
5. The pre-investigation attitude of credulity or commitment without 
testing of evidence mruces coherence impossible since it merely refuses to 
investigate. 
6. The pre-investigation attitude of unbiased receptivity indicates 
the willingness to accept evidence for whate~r value coherent investigation 
may show it to possess. 
7. Evidence for coherence may be beliefs or present experience, but 
beliefs are a ways grounded in present experience. Therefore co1erence is 
grounded in present experience ultimately. 
3 Verification. "The problem of veri fi cation, 11 says 
Brightman, "is a bone of contention in modern philosophy and ca.'mot be 
solved without a complete system of logic and epistemology . u21 The present 
dis~ussion can but indicate the different meanings of the term and out ine 
its basic implications . 
Semantically speaking , verification has at least three distinct 
meanings . Philosophically speaking, it has at least two and possibly three 
meanings . verification , first semantically, may 1. refer to the entire pro-
21. Brightman, POR, 234. 
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cess whi ch evaluates the t ruth of a given hYPothesi s , 22 2. refer to the 
end or outcome of inquiry , 23 or 3· refer to the t ruth of the given hypothe-
24 
sis. Considered philosophically , verification has meant 1. Il logical cer-
tification 1125 which holds in substance that the obj ect or hypothesis is log-
ically or conclusive y true or false or that its conformity to rea i ty · s 
logically certain , and 2. verification has been given the very different 
meaning as t 'he stating of the degree of probability which a gi ven hYJ?othe-
sis may have, e.g. , false, doubtful or certain , or any of the intermediate 
degrees bet·."leen those terms. The former posit i on i s maintained by "absolu-
ti sts 11 and t he l at ter by "relativists. " 
has been p roposed by Groos which unite s the two position s into what may be 
called practi cal certainty. This t ype of verificati on is a verification of 
nventure 11 or a wi llingness to 11 treat our bel i efs, whenever they pers · st in 
the face of cool reflection on the situation , as absolute truths , at least 
'pending further developments .' u26 Now, u-pon close inspection of this ast 
definition, it will be noted that i t bears a marked resemblance to the first 
characteristic of belief 'as defined in this t hesis . I f t he se definitions are 
correct , it woul d follow that the relation of belief to verification and 
22. Verification is treated in this manner in Brightman, POR , 119ff. 
23 . See Dewey , LOG, 7· 
24. Brightman , POR , 121 , u se s the word in this way. 
25 . This view , although prevalent in modern philosophy , has somewhat 
subsided wi th the rise in t he influence of pragmatism and empirici sm in re-
cent philosophy. It is still evident in the writings of Earth and hi s fol-
lowers , and epistemological monists such as Lacinto sh. PBK, 313 , 374. 
26. Ibid., 472 . 
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certainty is a very close one . The i :nplications of this o serv ti on wil l 
be stated later . But for now. , there is an ir~ortant point to be brought au 
Th e s~,r:n thesi s of absoluti st a nd rel a tivist views of verif ication makes one 
a n :possi ly t wo thi ngs neces sary: 1) an eva l uation of the old or given hy-
p ot 1.esis i n t!1e light of new evid.ence conerently tested, and 2) a revision 
of the hypo t h esis i n th e light of tl e coherentl y tested evidence . I:' no evi 
dence i s foillld which con trE>,dicts or mo difies the h;;r!)o thesis in question , it 
may be ca.lle9. true , tentatively at ~eEt st , provided t here is so me evidence 
in its !'avor . It would b eco :ne l'.:l'lowl edge, t:1en, i n accordance VIi t h t he de:::' i n:i,.. 
tio·1 ad.o:p t ed earlier in the discu si an . If , however , any evidence is re-
vealed by investigati on and coherent t .ou.~ht to contradic t or .w.odify the 
ori ginal hy·po the sis , 1 t 1Jecomes neces~ary t o r evise the ori ginal hypothe-
s i 's to render harmonious t b e di sco::cde,n:b elemen ts , or , i n the ab sence of any 
:positive evicLence , t o di scard it as f alse , "at least ' p ending further de-
velo!,)ments . 111 In th e case of a n experienced fs,ct , whi ch t hi s discu ssion has 
found to e t h e onl y real ev i denc e , it i s necessary to revt se tl--.e hy-pot1 
sis . Onl y situa tions belie-·.red-in ·mEty b e di scarded as f alse . 
vi i. Comdt.·ent to Resul ts of ! nv estcli.gation . This po i n t in the 
discus sion bring s out the second f actor in the act of belief , vi z ., co1..-
mi t ··aen t t o the results of the i nvestigation i n cludi ng verification . I t 
can be seen w..at commitmen t is actt"tally a reassertion of th e B.tti tud.e of 
receptivity or t rust i n the evidence . Before investi gation t hat trust was 
rnanifestecl i n the faith t hat co .. erent thought wor k i ng upon both i nternal and 
external evidence coul d. and woul d r eveal its true nature . After investi ga-
ti on , t ::,at t rust is r.-a.nife s ted i n a comrnitment to both t he evaluated 1yno-tr.. 
---=-=====*==-=-===-==============================-====--=~~~=-===============*======== 
sis as false, doubtful or certain , ru1d to the revised hypothesis. There is 
seen in this analysis , therefore, a marked similarity between belief ru1d 
faith. 28 
viii. Classification of Factors in Relation to Logical Certainty. 
In the discussion of verification, the view was presented that ''practical 
certainty" was available. It seems advisable here to classify the elements 
of belief in their relation to logical certainty . 
1. Existence of Present Experience ••.• Certain 
2. Reference beyond Present E:X:peri:ence • . Uncertain 
3. Validity of Untested Judgment • 
4. Commitment to Untested Judgment 
against Contrary Evidence. • 
5· Commi tment to Unbiased Receptivity 
6. Validity of Coherent Investigation 
• Uncertain 
.Logically Uncertain 
Psychologically Certain 
. .Logically Certain 
Psychologically Certain 
•• Relatively Certain 
.7· Commitment to Results of Investigation. Certain 
8. Validity of Revised Hypo thesis Practically Certain 
3. The Dialectical Structure of Belief 
The dialectical structure of belief will be apparent from what has 
already been stated about the dial ectic itself and the following presenta-
tion. The dialectic includes both ogical and psychological aspects of be-
lief, as was pointed out above (u . 38). 
28. For a view which holds faith to mean trust or obedience (com-
mitment), see Br ightman, POR , 178-182. 
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As has been stated earlier , belief actually begins with the ,judg-
ment or knowledge-claim. Therefore this is the thesis in the first stage 
of the dialectic of belief. However , experience of contradictory evidence 
is very likely to exist already or to occur. ~nis is the antithesis. Out 
of these two elements there arises the synthesis in the form of the ne ed 
for a subjective attitude toward both the thesis and the antithesis. 
At this point , the person may become guilty of committing himself 
to the thesis and disregarding the new evidence. In this case , the dialec-
tic stops, and the experience of evidence remains ·issociated from the 
rest of the person's personality . 
If, however , the decision to investigate is made, he must adopt 
an attitude of unbiased recenti vi ty to all the evidence or impair the dia-
lect ic to the degree he refuses to do so. This , t hen becomes the new thesis . 
The antithesis is immediately apparent in the experience of inspection ofall 
the evidence. But in order to ful fill the re quirements of the thesis and 
antithesis , there arises the synthesis or the need for a criterion. 
At this point the person again must decide , this time as to which 
criterion he will use. It may be any of those isted and discussed earlier. 
c herence has been shovm to be the most satisfactory. The apnlication of 
coherence, thus ·would become the new thesis. Ho71ever, upon application of 
the criterion the antithesis makes its appearance in the form of the dis-
covery or experience of incoherent factors in the hypothesis . At this point 
the synthesis is the need for reassertion of the subjective attitude. 
The person ~ay here wish to reject the evidence and commit himself 
to the original judgment. Eut let us suppose· the evidence has been recog-
nized. Then the new thesis would be adoption of evidence to date . ~1e new 
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~antithesis , it follows , is the exoerience of evaluation of t he oriPinal 
I ,judgment . The synthesis is the comrnitment to the results of the investi-
gation . 
Most judgments end this way. Some , however, do not. Especially is 
this true of value judgments. In any case the original j udgment may be re-
vised, and, to allow , the dialectic to proceed, it ought to be . If the 
person chooses to revise the original hypothesis, the dialectic would pro-
ceed thus: thesis, original .iu <k,oment or hypothesis, exoerience of incoher-
ent factors is the antithesis, and the revised h4~othesis is the synthesis. 
This really does not complete the dialectic~It is a perpetual pro-
cess. The ethic or ought idea in it is the as~umption of the right atti-
tude. If this is maintained, there will always be a desire for new evi-
dence. The eye , so to speak , is not geared to the facts themselves, but 
to truth. Thus the pur suit of truth or t rue knowl edge is not a static thing 
but a "principle of constant reorganizat ion," a constant living thing. It 
is here that the merely ru1alytic aspects of l ogic and psy~~ology fail to 
give a tru.e picture. It is only by belief that certainty may be appr oach ed 
honestly, and life be imparted to the seel er . 
29 . It is advisable at this point to note that the dialectical t -
t ern here presen ted is i n no way connected with absolutistic conceptions · 
whi ch Hegel entertained . This process never become s completed i deally . It 
ma y be though t of as a n 11 ascending lad.der of knowledg e •11 Dewey' s process of 
v erifi cation as presen ted in his L o F:iC. is relevant at this point . 
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CHAPTER IV 
RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
1. PreliminarJ Discussion 
The progress of this thesis has shown belief to be of the utmost 
importance in the taSk of understanding the nature of reality. It is now 
time to ask the question whether "religious be ief 11 is the same as other 
mo es of belief, whether it is unique, or whether there is another posi-
tion which mediates these two opposing views . ~ne answers to these ques-
tions will be developed in the pages to follow. 
L The Idea of Value. Closely allied vrith the question /hat is 
real? is the question: \r.hat is valuabl e? I n the history of philosophy there 
are at least four major types of value theories: hedonistic, voluntaristic , 
1 formalistic, a~d synoptic. Briefly , they may be descri ed as fol l ows . The 
hedonistic theories hold that value and p easure .are identical. Toluntar-
istic t 1eories hold that value is equivalent to desire or purpose s tis-
faction. Tle formalistic theories hold that value equals loyalt- to obli-
gation. s-y-noptic theories, however , admit the existence of he onic, i-
tional and intellectual factor·s in vc:.l uation but a so s a te th t t _ey 
must al l be "organized and interpreted by an ideal of pers nality, • • . t e 
::> 
conception of what man ought to be. u- Recent phi l osophy ~.as seen a very 
marked increase in the popularity of voluntaristic theories of value an 
• Of. Brig tma , ITP, L~Off. 
2 Ibid. , 142. 
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as a ma~ed decline in the number of ex~onents of the forw~li stic theory . 
hat , then, is the re l ation between the real and the valuable? I 
must be remembered that only consc · ous experience not reality itself is 
subject to t _e knowl edge of the person . Values must, t erefore, be con-
scious experience . But all cons cious experience, as we have seen , refers to 
something obj ective as its cause. Before discussing the pros ro1L c ns of 
t he objectivity of va ue it wou d be well at east tentative y to define 
what is meant by the term value. A value may be defined a~ any experience 
or sumJosed source of experience that is believed to point to ard the so u -
tion of a.."ly -probl em. But all values may not be true values . A true value, 
applying the criteri n of truth , i s any value t .<:>.t has been tested c her-
e t y . Horl!'.ativel y speaking, then, t1e val uational attitude is the at · -
tu e of be l ief on the part of the person i n an~ eviden ce whatever t at 
The controversy over the ob jecti ·i ty and subjectivi t;y of value has 
een the heart of muc 1 of the are,"Uffientation regarding t ... eistic an anti-
t _ei st ic belief in recent philosophy. A brief discussion of this pro lem is 
necessary at t is time . That value is v; o l y subjective, or depencen ' upon 
tl1e experiences of t e ilLivi ua or group is the viev: of t ... ose who ... olC.. 
t o t e su jectivity- or' va ue. Ob ject i ve values, accor ing to th se ho 1 
the ob j ecti i ty of value, are val es a l minds "ought to acknowl edge ( og i-
cal objectivity) .. . and ..• that they are veli no t only for human ind ' vi uals 
and groups out .for the univer se ... (metaph~Tsical objectivity . 113 Coherent 
thought reveal s truth in each of the se :posi icns . The di~ ectic o f be -
. Brightman, ITP, 150. For an excellent and extensive discussi on 
of this ar5 ' aent , see ibi d ., 146-165 . 
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lief makes a revision of each of the hypotheses necessary . T_ e resultan t 
h ypothesis would be as follows : for values to be personal and still be ob-
j e ctive to hwnan being s the only solution is belief in a mind oth er than 
h w:n.an i ndividu..als and societies , a Su:preme Mind such as is held by repre-
sentatives of personalistic i dealism. 
It may now "be seen that tho s e who hold religious belief to b e the 
same as o t her mod.es of belief tend to b e believers in the subjectivity of 
value . Those who hold relig ious beli ef to be 1.mique tend towa rd the belief 
in the objec tivity of value . Tho s e who hold to the synth esis of these two 
opp osing v iews tend toward a personalistic account of reality a n d value . 
ii . Restatement of the Definitionsof Religion and Go d . In Chapter 
I reli gion was def ined as belief i n the source of exneriences which are 
regarded as of suureme value together with the i rrmlications of that beli ef . 
Thi s , necessari l y , is a desc~iptiv e definition , one that expresses ~hat is 
essential to the conc ept . Any seeming 11 barren- ness11 this definition may 
have had in Chapter I r..a s been relieved by the meaning given to t h e word 
11 belief . 11 For the sake of clarity, a more complete definition is desirable . 
Reli <>·ion is belief in the source of eXPeriences which a re regarded as of 
suureme value . beli ef be i n,q: u..11derstood as comprisin;£' both the attit.u cles of 
un ia.seo. receu tivi.:t.Y. a n d. commi t ment to eXPerience s of the hi ghest value 
torreth er with the_tr .. .JJ.f!:l21ications . Religion, then , will be seen as synony-
mous with reli gious beli ef . 
· God has been defined in Chapter I as the S1..lnreme Cosmic Person who 
creates , sustains . and controls a l l cosmic process for t h e real i zation of 
£ & h i "'hest nossible value . It does no t , however , seem necessar:r t o ma.i::1-
_5 
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tain the i ea that all religion mu t include this particule.r idea of Go • 
The essence of re ligion as been found to reside in an atti tu e of the 
person toward the object of his intellectual conceptions, not in either his 
~ttitude or the. object·o~ his intellectual conceptions by themselves. God, 
thus defined, may be t _e goal of religious belief but as such can never 
truly and honestly be reached independently of religious belief. It is the 
primary aim of this thesis to investigate the destination of this attit de 
of religious belief . The next section of this chapter will be evoted to 
the thought of some recent phi l osophers who have reached both theistic and 
anti - theistic conclusions . 
2. Recent Philosophical Thought: Atheistic Conclusions 
i. E. Russell's Hedonism. 
1) Exposition. The key-i ea in Russel 's phil osophy is 
"happiness. 11 Although happiness has not been synonymous with hedonism in 
t _ e i story of. philosophy, the partie 1la.r interpretation Russe 1 gives 
to the search for happiness is very close indeed to the basic meaning of 
hedonism. This discussion of Russell's thought shall be given , therefore, 
t o an analysis of this key-idea together with a criticism of its logical 
implications. 
Russell takes as his starting place the question: 11What can a roan or 
woman , he re and now, in the midst of our nos t algic society, do to achieve 
4 happiness fo r himself or herself? " His solution to the problem is first 
e l iminate the causes of unhappiness . These causes are largely 11 due to mis-
taken views of the world , mistaken ethics , mistaken habits of life, lead-
4. Russell, COH, 15-16. 
ing to a destruction of that natural zest a nd appetite for possible thing s 
upon which all hapPiness . .. depends . 11 5 The rra.jor portion of Russell's ;rit-
i ng on this subject is taken up with the task of re oving wr.ta t __ e believes 
to be these rnistaken views i n the hope that t:O.e na tural desir es ' thus un-
covered will be free and unhampered to a ttain their aim. These aspect s 
wil l be di scussed under the f ol lowing f our points . 
First , Rus sell 1 s view of na ture and man redu es :physiology to p y-
sics . Thought energy is reduced to chemi stry. All views on ~od nQ i mmor-
tal ity are reduced to fiction since neither is essential to relifi on . . ~in 
spite of the f act that 11 the~" are pleasant~' Since our mental life is ou.'1d 
up with rain structure and organized odily energy, Russell f i nd it 11 r a;. 
tiona.l to suppo e tha t mental life ceases ''hen bodily life ceases . 11 6 't at 
we like has no bearing Tl.pon what is wljen we are dealing with nature . 7 
Secondly, Ru s sell's view of ethics sows a curious rever al of 
thou_zl1 t . W .en we deal with t-'~Le philosophy of va lue , Russell a ys , 11 There is 
no ou tside atanda.rd t o show that our va luation is right or wrong ." Since 
it is we w. o create value , 11 we are gr eater than Ne. ture .. . even for .:a ture 
personifie d a s God . 11 9 Russell 1 s idea of the good life is 11 love guided by 
knowledge . ul O But this criterion is admittedly inca.pable of proof a.n d is 
even ina pplicable because a perfect world. would. ha.ve 11 every sentien t being 
be to every other the object of the ful lest love compounded of delight , 
benevolence and understanding inextricably blended , nll and. in this actual 
5 . Russell , COH , 16 . 
6 . Ibid . , 15 . 
7 • Ibid .• , 22 • 
8 . Russell , lf!B , 24 . 
9 . Ibid . , 24-25 . 
10 . Ibid. . , 28 . 
11. !bid. ' 34 . 
47 
wor d we cannot 11atten..-pt this attitude toward. all sentient beings ." 2 Rus-
sell~ refusal to grant the objectivity of value in any sensa whatever for-
ces h i to a complete et ical relativism based upon pragmatic consequences, 
a position which has the characteristics of both he donic and voluntaristic 
value theory. 13 
Thirdly, Russell's view of the practical aspects of life -fa lo~s 
naturally from his ethics . He states that "the practical need of morals 
arises from the conflict of desires. 1114 Current orality is said to be a 
II curious blend of utilitarianism a.nd superstition . ul5 Hence the man with 
the scientific out l ool wi ll not be content to say 11 SLlch-and-suc_ an act i s 
sinful ••• he will inquire whether it does any harm , or ••• whether ••• the be-
lief that it is sinful does any harm. 1116 .:e·e the element of edonism in 
Russel is very apparent. Russell is stating that the aim of the scientific 
out l ook is a hedonistic onel 
•. fuch of R-u.ssell Is effort has been given to pointing out defects in 
the theory and practice of traditional re ligion. The individua istic idea 
of "find"ng salvation" or conversion is ca lled a short-cut ecause , he 
says , " the good life must be lived in a good society . ul7 11 To buil up t e 
good li fe one must instead build up intelli ence , self control , and s~~­
S pathy. 11 
Russell Is book The Oonouest o ~ Hanpiness lists eight obstacles in 
practical life which l ead to a destruction of the possibility of hap~iness . 
. 12. Russell, ' 1I B, 34-
13 . Ibid. , 37· 
14. rid •• 43 . 
15. Ibid., 47. 
6. r· id., 49. 
7. Ibid ., 69 . 
8 . Ibid.' 72. 
4 
They are : :Byronic unha:ppiness, cornpeti tion , bored.om and excitement , fatigue , 
envy , the sense of sin , persecution rnania , fear of public opinion. These 
obstacles should be replaced b : the following correctives : elimination of 
lamentation and nostalgia for the pa s t by 11 a more courageous acceptance of 
the modern outlook and a determination to roo t out nominally discarded su-
perstitions from tl eir obscure hiding places , " 19 e..dmi t the part 11 of sane an 
quiet enjoyment i n a alanced ideal of life . u20 ·ore courage would bring 
less worry and less f atigue . Companiona te marriage is a.dvocated.Enj oy p ·eas- ~· 
ant thing s to the full ; don't compare them wi th other thing s that may be 
happening to someone else . 11 Rebel against i the 1 sickly nonsensel' of t~e sens 
of sin. 21 Don't be so egotistic . The public should be more tolerant . 
FoclTthly, what does Russell have left after having removed all the 
"traditional supersti tions11 ? He hopes he has what is necessary to the at-
tainrnent of happiness , or 11 that natural zest a nd appetite for possible thL 
upon which all happiness , whether of men or anima.ls , ultimately depends ." 
He finds , however , that "ha ppiness is of two sorts , • .. plain and fancy , or 
animal and s:piri tual.u22 He admits ;that there are 11 bad desires" and calls 
them 11 the worst feature of human nature and the one which it is most neces-
sary to chaP..ge if the world is to grow happi er . 11 23 Russ ell is .onest enough 
to admit that there are limits within 1Nhich desires rrn.1.st abide . It is the 
task of science end education to i nn) rove the 11 activi ties by which t ese 
pleasures are to be obte.ined . 11 24 However , Russell is r eluctant to say tba t 
19 . Russel l, COR , 38 . 
20 . I i d . , 55 . 
21 . !bi d., 104 . 
22 . Ibid. , 143 . 
23 . Russell , ~IB , 76 . 
24 . Russell , COR , 145 . 
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l ife s..'-lould be t oo closely regt; l 1ated: 11 our i mpulses , when ever not :pos tivel y 
destructi ve or i n jurious t o others , ought if po s sible to have free :play .. . 
because our i mpulses and de sires a re the stuff out of ~hich our happine s s 
is to be n'ade . n25 But , nevertheless , to realize the high er or spiritua.l 
ha ppi ness , pleasure must de~end " more than anyU1ing elae upon what may be 
called a friendl y i ntere s t in person s and t hings .•. no t a graspi ng and :poe-
se ssi ve attitude seeking alYiays a n emphatic response . n26 It is in the l1gl: 
of tr.d.s attitude t hat Russell con si der.s h i mself more or l e ss of a ooralist . 
2 ) Crit i cal Analysis . The t hree negative and one !)ositiv e 
aspects of Russell's t h ough t just presented r.mst now b e i n spected cri ticall;s 
First the following favorable comments nay be rrade . 
There is value in a ny a.t tempt to stir people's thinkin~ in regard 
t o thingsth~t have been ta~en for granted i n the past . It i s t rue tha t 
static a nd. predetermined tradi tionalisrns tend to produce stultification . 
Russell 's a ttem:9 t to 11cl ean house11 , if treated as a stinrulus, is a val uab le 
one provided, of cour s e , t he house itsel f is not cleared a~ay . 
Secondl y , there is vab.1e in hedonism in the sen se that it a peals 
t o oreat numbers of peo?le . If it is possibl e to i nterest many p eople in 
t he ide of val u e , even y means of t~ e val u e of pleasure , it is a.l~:ays 
probab le thet some hones t he rts will want to climb the ladder of truth who 
may not have taken ho l d at any o ther l evel . 
There are ma ny t1in-:. s i n Rus sell's thoug,."L:l.t , however , that are logi-
cally and philosophically questionable in their coherence . The mai n o jec-
tion s can be grouped together a s refutations of t he four po i nts cited. a ove 
2 5 . Russell , COE , 92 . 
26 . Ibid., 155 . 
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as represent ative of his thought. 
First , Russel 's view of the worl d inc l uding nature and man is in-
sufficie~tly synopti c . It does not re cogni ze that physi ology ~resents cha -
a ctex·ist.!.c: .JI'C:;Sc~:·:J o~.l ./ in organic life whi ch a re absent from pure y p y -
sical matter . I t does not recognize that tho~lght ife or consc'ousness ~os-
sesses such characteristics as experience of sens tion, memory, :p• pose , 
f ree o~, val ues, etc . • none of which can be red · ced to chemistry. · s e • s 
view of God is determined c~iefly by noting inadequacies i n cer aiL ~ i ~ ~s 
e out Got.. and i n the act i ons of those who :profess belief in God, rat her 
t han by a thoughtfu l weighing of the actual eviC.ence fo r and agaiL.st tl e e-....-
istence of God. 7 I mmort a lity stands or fallE. al ong with 11bo i y life ." But 
· ssell has previousl y fai l ed to no ti ce t e i .ea of 11life 11 calling it ere-
Everyone ~mow s that t e el ectrons wit in he ocy on 't 
isappear at deat ' • T ey erel y assume differen· arrangements. 1 us s-
se 's osmoloz;y col apses into irratiomtli sm. 
Secon l y , Russell' s ethics is based upon the unqualifie acce~ptance 
of the subjectivity of val e . It has alrea y been s orm earlier in thi s 
chapter t 1at this posit i on , althoug partially tree cannot st and by itself 
ro1d give a coherent account of the facts of e2~erience. Thus Russel 's e 
i cs is a part ial truth in need of a mo r e co erent inspect i on of evidence. 
Thir l y, Rt.tssell ' s practi cal theory , which remtlts from the cern in-
ing of his irrationa cosmo Og'.f and incoherent ethics , is truly a marv·el to 
behold. How to satisfy the der~n s of the a t omistic present and sti re-
main civilized is a problem to Russell who has cast off a l ethical m or-
ings, al traditional i deas. He denounces tr~diti onal moral s in scathing 
2 • Cf. Erightro&~. ~yt .( l944) in Sc~illp , ~PER . 
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terms , paying more attention to t.e evils of their presence t .an to the 
evils t . eir absence mi ght ·in.cu~: The only indi cation of a criterion by 
whic to render these judgments is an e.:99eal to consensus ~en tiwn co. ibined 
;it~ pra ~tism. The insufficiency of these criteria has already been demon 
st r nted in Chapter II . Pis i n terest in disproving t he idea of i ndividual 
salvati on as being a slow way to social betternen t indicates a elief in 
a 11 social minc1!1 vlhich is non-existent and. a refusal to r ecogni ze that so-
cial ~>roc-ress i possible onl~r w."'en i ndivic.ual progress occurs. Russell 1 s 
id.,a.s on :!lE'.rriag e and other so-eial relations , ba sed. as t e~r are u:po~1 t h e 
a toL i stic and hedo~i stic princi:ples of 11 free play for Le fu..11damen tal vi tal 
inpulses11 are obviously sociall~ incoherent as well as morally detrimental 
in their i1 fluence . Thus Russell 1 s :practical theory leads to great confu-
sion in thought as well a s conduct . 
Fourthly, Russell 1 s yositive contributi on which recognizes tat 
there are at least t wo kinds of ha.:9Piness is t ypical of his best tho~ght . 
It is here that he is willing to reco gnize factors that :point away from 
the incoherent in hedonism toward a more satisfactory reali zation of it . 
He recogni zes that the highest type of happiness depends upon 11 a friendly 
interest in persons and things." This i s the nearest Russell come s to a d-
mitting any criterion objective to the desire itself . But , he seems to be 
afraid of t~ . .:. e i mplications of this idea . Instead of carrying it t . raug 1 , •e 
says t:h..at only the mo st dangerous desires should be regulated . This result s 
in a relatively social hedonism of t e relatively proximate rat er t .. :::m an 
ato!!lis tic 1!.ecloni sm of t~.:.e :t-J.ere a nd now--the conception with which e began 
his disctlssion . 
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ii. R. W. Sellars' Nat~ralirun . 
1) Exposition~ Se lar s is concerned with a new approach to 
things . To accomplish this he fee l s , like Russell, that the old , "outw rn 
traditions n religious and non- religious must be <liscarcled. Science posses -
es "exact ~ orrledge which is rounding int o so-net __ ing of t e nature of a 
whc.le ,·rhose inter:?retation does not adrrit of doubt . 11 2 The major eff rt of 
Sel lars has been constructive , but he has \'Iri tten at least two boo. s which 
have been directed toward the discrediting of traditional religious concep-
29 tions , including the i ea of God. These negative aspe cts in ~~s thoug t 
may be summarized brief y as follows: 
First , the supernatural attachments of past religion are essentially 
unfoU11ded and wil l drop from re l igion.3° 
Second y, the idea o f 11personal agency 11 is likeY;rise mythica an a 
remnant of primitive religious associa.tions.31 
Thir l y , t eism is merely a "developed form of pri itive animism.u32 
Fourthly , a tenable syste n of theo ogy which is self-consistent 
and rel evant to the worl as we know it canno t be written.33 
More constructivel y , however , nat1.1ralism is presented by Sel lars i n 
a new manner. Contrary to the older reductive ~ materialistic an mechanis-
tic the ries , Sel ars attempts to present a newer , more constructive natur-
alism which takes account of the various levele of e:>:istence , namely , life , 
mind , a.'1d society as well as matter.--4 His "evolutionary" approach , as he 
23 . 3· 
29. in Religi on and Re l igion Comes of Age. 
30. 6. 
3 • 
32. 
33· 
34. Sellars, EN, Ch . I. 
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calls it , is based upon a 11 physicalisrd1 a nd 11 the fact of crea tive syn the-
sis1J35 Fundamental to this conception is a critical realistic epi s temology 
( d1.o.a.listic)i36 The major ideas i n h is th01.1gh t may b e summa ri zed as fo llows . 
First , ~hysiceli sm. Sellars states that all nature cons i s t s of a 
11 materie.l isrn •. . of i nvo lved unities and :pat terns . u37 All life , then , ilmu.st 
be physicali zed . u38 11 Being ca11 as sume many forms . The new natural is is 
not reductive . 11 39 
Secondly , creative s'mthe sis . Th ts is the process by which r eali t y 
evolves . ~~damental to it is a c~itical realistic epistemo l ogy . The old 
materi ali stic epistemology is rejected as 11 too naive and ina dequate . H40 
Also icleali stic dualism is rejecte a_ as building 11 too exclusively upoh en-
tal contents and upon in trospective p sychology . 11 41 He thus .re j ect s t.e idea 
that we knov.r n0thing but the states of our minds . His criti cal realism in-
s ts t s , as do es naive realism, that the physical thine is from the be6 · nni ng 
an object of our knowl edge . 42 He explains t hat 11 the el ements giv en i n t _e 
fie l d of union witll the p e r ceptual attitude are f u sed and a r e inti mately 
oualified as a n external thing by t he a fo resaid realistic meanings . Thus i s 
the category of thinghood ach ievec. . u43 
ThirCily , yalue s are sub jective only. Sellar s , as did Russell ,dEfuiE'is. ·= 
the objectivity of values a.nd i deals . Though they a re 11 condit i oned objec-
tively by the na ture of their objects , they are yet pri rr:arily personal and 
; 1 t h t . h . 11 Lid s oc1a , l8. 1s , _unan . -- Sellars defines religion as 11loyal ty to t _ e val-
ues of li fe .'145 Religion will have objects only in the sense of purposes to 
35 . :Sellars , PPR , 3 . 41. Ibid., 317 . 
36 . Ibid., 2 , 17. 42 . Ibid., 135 . 
37 . bid., 4 . 43 . I bid., 136 . 
38 . Ibid., 3 . 44 . I bid., 342 . 
39 . Ibid., 6 . 45 . Sellars , 1rSR , 7 . 
40 . Sellars E!T ., . 319 . 
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fulfill . It will no longer have need of a special view of the world . u46 
The spiri tua.l inclucles 11 all those pu.rposes , experiences , and activ i ti es 
which express n1a:.1 1 s nature ... The spiri tu.a.l is man at his best , ma n l oving 
oaring , creating , fi ghting loyally a nd coura g eously for causes dear to hi •1 
47 The conditions for t.he sr,>iri tual life are 11 sanity, heal th , and a capaciLy .' 
to be fi red by con surning purposes.n48 
2) Critical Analysis . Sellars' aversion to supernatural 
elements is based for t h e most part upon the fact t hat ost people ave 
cD~nged t eir inds a bout su ch things . 49 Consensus ~entium has already been 
sho~~ to be untrust Orthy a s a criterion of truth . Secondly , regarding per-
sonal a{!;ency and, thirdly, theistic belief, Sellars is quite eviden tly o.is-
suaded from these positions b :r the f act that they originated. in an unscien-
tific manner . This , obviously , is an occe.sion of the genetic fallac;:; .Fourt;. --
ly, Sellars' challeng e to create a 11 tenable sy stem of theologyi1 a nd his 
confidence that it cannot be done is quite neatly answered by :acin tosh : 
"There a re others who perhaps have given more thou.ght to the sub ject t:!-J.8.n 
Dr . Sellars has , who are just as confident that it can be done . " 50 
The evolutionary naturalis of Sellars overlooks the fact that mere 
inclusion of the h i gher forms of e xistence into its system does not estab-
lish an organic unity within that sys tem. The reductive element which h e 
tries to eliminate crops up a~ain when he 11 :physicalizes11 the asp ects of the 
world i n to one all-inclu sive ter . . As Knudson observes , this t ype of "'" ink-
ing is 11 pure verbali sm. It does not carry the sl ightest i n sight . 11 5- Thus 
46 . Sellars , NSR , 8. 
47 . Ibid ., 7-8 . 
4'8 .. -. 1bid,. , - E. 
49 . Of . ibid., 6- 7 . 
50 . 58-cintosh , PRK , 132 . 
51 . Knudson POP 365 . 
Sellars' cosmology is an at tempt to be s~1optic , but it loo s for t~ e high-
est value in both the beginning and the end of the evolutiona ry process. 
This idea ac tually destroys itself . 
The criti~al realistic epistemology of Sellars, which i nsi sts upon 
' knowledge' of t he wor~d but re jects any ' intuition • of it , or a world of 
thought and not i~~ediate experience , 52 actL~l ly tries to account for both 
knowledge and thinghood . The process which he says takes place here is bn£~- · 
ling . Thinghood, as has been shovm in Chapter II , or duality of object and 
knower is the condition of knowledge not the result of it . 53 Sel l a r s claim 
of "exact knowledge" for science is an u.11critical state . en t , and one which 
ost scientists would hesitate to accept. 
The sub j ective theory of value which Sellars ho l ds , thoug_ t inged 
with o jectivi ty here a nd there , is wholly sub jective and is subject to th e 
criticism de earlier that it fai ls to account coherently for the f acts of 
logical and etaphy s i cal ob jec tivity . 
The thought of Sellars i s not without merits , however . First , the 
trend away fro "h edonistic calculus11 54 is a t least one step i n t he direc-
tion of a more coheren t t heory of val ue . 
Secondly , if there i s any source fo r :pleasure , as 'Russell says , it 
wil l e found in persons and thing s . Thi s Sellars has apParently ne , in I 
his _ wra.ni sm and hi s naturalis .• Consequently , he as sub stituted acoxrp]ete~-
ly voluntar istic value theory for the semi - hedonistic and voluntaristic one 
of Russell. 
Thiroly , Sellars' reaction against the older , .ore stat ic theories 
of ma terialism is an i ndication that he has isolated t 1e element of a c t ivity 
52 . Cf . Knudson , POP , 3G4. 54 . Sellars , ]ThT , 343 . 
53 . Cf . ibid ., 363ff . 
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in na.ture , although he fails to dev elop it coherently . 
i v . J . Dewey's Pragma.ti sm. 
1) Exposition. Unctoubtedly the most influential of pra g1 ~ 
tists and probabl y t e mo st i nfluential of contemporary philosophers in 
u1erica is John Dewey . Hi s prolonged avoidance of the subj ect of religion 
follov:ing his early rejection of Hegelianism a nd the forcefulness with which 
1is late r prC~.'"" etic i nterpretation of the subject o.enies theis hcwe com-
bined to form the basis for h is beinE: called 11 proba ly t . e mo st infb~ential 
person in the development of anti-theis tic hurnanisn in twentiet century 
A . erica . 11 55 
If any one concept could be applied to Dewey1 s thought , it ould 
probably be found in the words 11 prac tica.l acti vi ty1 or "practical conse-
quences . 11 Dewey's though t is thoroughly permeated with this idea , al ost to 
the point of king every thing reduceable to t h i s idea or its corrolaries . 
Dewey 's u1 ti ate aim, as ~cintosh notes , 56 11 has been that of posi-
tivism, to enlist science i n the servi e of hun:anity . 11 However , to acco 
plish this , Dewey believe s hi s task is to "help get rid of t:le useless luu-
. h? ber that block s our highway s of thought ."'-' In The Q;ueat....for Certainty this 
aim is expressed in t e re jection of epistemology and me tap ysics together 
with the at tendent conception of a personal Go d. Considera tion ~ill no . be 
given to his treatment of these concepts together with an a nalysi of their 
fate at hi s hands . 
First , Dewey 1 s denial of epistemolo£y is couched in the somewJ:>..at 
a mb i guous concepts 11 ul timate'1 or 11 antecedent Being. 11 The following passage 
55 . ~:a.cin to s..'J. , PBK. 79 . 
56 . Ibid., 4 . 
57 . Dewey, CAP ; cited in Macintosh , PP..K . 84 . 
illustrates the general plan of his effort and the relations of the ele-
ments to eaCh other: 
Depreciation (of practical acti vi t yJ is warranted on the basis 
of two :premises: first , namely , that the object of knowledge 
is some form of ultimate Being ••• ant ecedent to reflective in-
quiry and independent of it; secondly , that this antecedent 
Being has among its defining characteristics those properties 
which alo~§ have authority over the formation of our judgments 
of value • .,~ 
This; Dewey says, must be rejected. because some philosophers have claimed 
"comple te correspondence between knowledge in its true meaning and what is 
real."59 Dewey denies that the krowing process is laying hold of "exi stence 
which is nrior to and apart from the operations of inquiry and their co;.1se-
60 quences.u Knowledge instead is a biological fact, 11 a natural function or 
event. 1161 
Secondly, Dewey's denial of metaphysics is based upon his :previous 
denial of epistemology. If there is nothing previous to knowing , then no 
independent reality can exist. But to assert that no reality whatever ex-
ists is nonsense. Consequently , Dewey adopts the 11 despe rate expedient of in-
62 
terpreting experience and its sub j ect in terms of biology. 11 or accounting 
for the universe and the knower in terms of biological instrumentalism or 
instrumental naturalism~ 
Dewey's denial of the objectivity of value and, consequently, belief 
in God is based upon his conclusions regarding epistemology and meta:pl~sics . 
The placing of values in the realm of ontology is a result of man 1 s desire 
for certainty . This desire to :put values in a higher realm , Dewey says, 
"may give consolation to the depressed but does not change the existential 
58. Dewey , QC, 69. 
59. Ibid., 21. 
60. Ibid. , 181. 
61. Dewey, Art.( l911) , 554; 
cited in V~cintosh, PRK, 86. 
62. Hacintosh , PRK, 93· 
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situation in the lea.st .1163 Val es are , then , not 11 a uthentic and val ic.. on l ;; 
on condition that they e.re properties of :Being i n de:pendent of hl.11Il3.n ac-
ti on . u64 
Fourthly , Dewey 's constructive conception is that of 11 experimental 
inquiry •11 11 Intellig ent action is the sole u1 tir'Pte resourse of rra.ntind in 
every field wha tever.u 65 Experience is defined as every event in natu..re 
which affects or rre.y affect consciousness ~ 66 Tb.i s ma.kes experience eq: i-
valent vri. th reality . To ask "Who se experience?" is to ask an absurd ques;_ 
tion . 67 Personality or mind is , instead , defined as 11 response to the doubt 
ful as such . ll 68 Experience is better understood as experiencing , which 
means "living , .. . trying anci undergoing .n69 Experimental method is 11directed 
and regulated c:hange . H70 Knowledg e in this light is "warranted asserti-
bili ty"71 ::.md occurs 11 VIhenever our inquiry leads to conclusions which set-
tle the problem out of which it grew . 11 72 
2) Critical Ana lysis . The following comh1ents nay be made 
regarding the main paints in Dewey's argu.rrant which appear defective ; 
First , Dewey's denial of epistemology on the occasion oft en~~ 
i~ of absolute certainty a nd the presence of any element in knov.ledg e 
other than the knower or the act of le1owing is incoherent thinking as has 
been shown in Cl~pter II of this thesis . 
Secondly , Dewey's denial of metaphysic s actually is not a denial 
at all but a denial of a certain brand of metaphysics , viz. , the ideal-
63 . Dewey, ~C , 35 . 
64 . Ibid., 44 . 
65 . Ibid., 252 . 
66 . Dewey , LOG 
67 . Dewey , EH , 231 ; 
ltf.acinto s , PRK , 89 . 
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istic . He is forced to adopt a naturalistic or biological expl anation of 
existence which is itself a metaphysi c s , one whi ch is l ess coherent than 
his thesis of practical consequences would logi cally warrant . 
Thirdly, the d@nial of the objectivity of .value is subject to the 
same criticisms given to the thought of Russel l and Sellars . The idea 
the.t it is necessary to choose between dependence upon God and the use of 
huma.Yl agencies i s an example of an invalid 11 ei ther-or. 11 
Fourthly , the definition of experience as synon;ymous with reality 
is extremely con£:using and fails t o expl ain the indiv" dual centers of con-
sciousness who may do the expe riencing. 
Fi fthly, a ctivity is meaningless, if not non-existent , apart from 
reference to the abiding and changeless. 
There are , however , distinct merits in Dewey's t h ought. They are : 
First , the incentive to act purposively is a healthy attitude and 
one that is conducive to growth and improvement . 
Secondl y , the conception of a static reality or Eeing is i mproved 
upon by the more cohe r ent conception of an a ctive r eali ty. 
Tl1.i·rdly ,' the idea that kl10 \"'ledce is not mysteriou sly impa r.ted it._-
' 
out a. res:!)onse on t e part J f the imower i also in accord wit the conclu-
sion :reached earlier i n t his tl esis . Epistemological monism nd pass ive 
recep ti vi t y of 1cnowl e0~S e a1·e conception s wh i ch t e previous discussion has 
found to be i nadequate . The person is a vi t a l element in th ' 'kno :ing ::.)ro-
cess an .: he reacts to sonething other t"l:an :.:,_i1:1self in the knowi ng p rocess . 
Fourthly , the v i e1'7 tl1a~t reality is no t wholly removed from t .... is 
system of ex-a-ience is a just c r iticism of so:.ne forms of su:pernaturalis •.•• 
Fifthl y , the acknowl edg ment of t eleology is a merit in t:._is day 
and .g e wbich has long den i eci its 'lllali di ty . 
Sixthly , there is I e. faintly :p<:rce:oti le tendency i n Dev:ey s thought 
to grant the obj.ec tivi t y of value . For e~m:ple , he says : values re qual -
ities that exis t in hun~n ex[::erience , 11 g enu.ine and knovm ualities of re-
al ity in i tself . " 73 
Se:taenthl y , the chapter on belief in tt1.i s thesis has shown tha t 
CO)msequ.ences a.rJ.d. activity , tho1.1.gh no t aJ.l .. ~ that is i r..volved, are essential 
to the dialectic o f belief and the formation of true concep tions of r e-
ali t;y . Essential also to valL1.1e theory are th e se fac tors . 
v . M. C. Otto ' s Huma nism. 
1) :ID::ci:>o sition . I n Eax Otto ' s th01€;L t is found what he hLu-
sel:f calls u a :nili tant interest in m£ln 1 s earth l y enterprise .. . e. :?O si tive 
interest in a life of happiness ancl di[.!lity for all so fa r as t1·Iis is a t -
tainable . 11 74 All t1eories a nd philo sophical conc e-~Jtions rJust bend to 
t1.is one ideal. Today men have lost faith in taking li f e comprehensively . 
T ey ' K:..ve thrown a way the r.uaps of life . Tl'.eir p r e s ent interests'' ave no pllce 
in a lar2:er htuna;.1 venture . " Otto , t herefo re , has set hi!!lsel f to the task 
of a n swering the c;reat hw~·tE,.n advertisement : 11 1JVa nted t A Philosophy of Life ~ it 
74 The fo llowin.s :points r:.ay be no ted as y.>resentins 0tto 1 s rcain icle2.s . 
73 . Dewey , q,( , 44 . 
7 4 . 0 t t o , HE) 3 • 
76. Ibid. , 20. 
77. Ibid. , 267 . 
78. Ibid. , 115. 
30. Ibid., 120 . 
81 . I bid., 69., 70. 
82 . Ibid., 76. 
needs. n83 .(They must be changed or di scar ed. when they become useless. 34) 
Fourthly , Otto's huma~is , central in his thought, dominates ru1d 
controls nis other conceptions . Wnile accepting evoluti on he is emphatic 
to emphasize what man mey bee e and warns agains·t judging man only by 
what he has been. 86 Religion also , he seys, mus·c be viewed "as it com-
poses itself in historical perspective. 11 Religi on is somethi ng "deep and 
urgent , somethi ng f orever forming itself anew yet never coming to perfect 
expression. n87 Traditional religion is completely re j ected as incompatible 
th t ' . . t f . . gg vri ne spl.rl. o· sc1.ence. 
Scie1tce is "designed to l ay bare the truth, no matter what ••• whom •• • 
or how it hurts. n89 Theor ~.tical science reshapes man• s conception of the 
worl , himself , and human destiny. Applied science affects a ll our lives3D 
The evil e feet of some uses of applied science is recognized , 1)ut Otto e-
lieves the solution to be an 11untra.rrmeled. study of fact in union with the 
hunt for t 1e most promising means of general hap:piness . 119l 
Fifthly, Otto's realism is also combined with evo lutioni sm. Reality 
is defined as II'Ghe stuff previous to idea s " or previous to 11projected 
92 
esires . 11 
terms of his 
Thus he a&nits a pre-existing nature93 but interprets it in 
pragmatic idealism. 94 Reality is "whatever it is that com-
mands a man , to which he gives himself up , in which he invests his ener-
gies , and for which he fears a.'ld hopes, t is is his reality . 1195 Otto grades 
reality into four areas: 1) nature, 2) animal kingdom , 3) resu ts of human 
83 . Ibid., 36. 90. See ibid., 247. 
84 . Cf. ibid. , 87. 91. Ib id., 279 -
85. Ibi d., 121. 92. Ibid. , 158. 
86 . Ibid. , 208 . 93· Cf. ibid. , 172. 
87 . Ibid. , 203. 94. Ibid. ' 177. 
!:'8 . Ibid. , 246. 95· Ibid., 178. 
_$9. Ibid. , 241. 
effort, and 4) intimately personal area: the world of things , animal s , peo-
ple and ongoing affairs. The "essential quality of the real is dependabi i-
ty" sa;)rs Otto. 96 The real is both dependent aDd independent of persons, re-
fleeting in the second sense "q:o.i te imper sonal processes and tendencies . " __.7 
Sixthly, Otto shows how atheism resemble s materiali mn in that it 
has two distinct meanings , the cosmic and the e thi cal , or the vie that 
there is value in the universe and the viev1 t .. a t there is no value i n the 
universe , respective l y . Otto re j ects the r a tter an he holds to the for~er 
with an 11a ffirmati ve faith in the non-existence of God. u98 The main reason 
he gives is that theism is "prohibitory and repressive, n99 although he does 
add that the question cannot be decided conclusivel y . lOO 
2) Critical Analysis . There is a great deal of merit in 
Otto's thou&~t. There i s much that could be better were it not for one 
great defect . However , attention will be given at this point to i ts . merits . 
First , that the beginning of all thought must be experiencelOl is 
a concept that agrees with the idea reached in Chapter III of this t h esis. 
Secondly , the f act that lcnowledge is perfectible is in keeping with 
the nature of knowledge as wel l as with the conclusions reached i n Chapter 
III . 
Thirdly, Otto 's e vo l utionism is related to experience and i mpl ies 
the perfectibility of knowledge. This is healthy and conducive to growth . 
Fourthly , Otto 's realistic idealism is a result of his evolutionism 
and is an interesting s;y-nthesi s of realism and val ue theory . 
96 . Ibid. , 191. 99. Ibid., 338. 
97 . Loc. cit . 100. I bid. , 339 . 
98 . Ibid. ' 334. 101. Ibid. , 2 . 
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Fifthly, the neg,ative , sociall;r ve.lua.ble ·effect of Otto~'s rea.lis-
tic ideali sm is his revolt a z;ainst crass roaterialism. 
T e f ollo ing defect , ~hich seems to be responsible for nost , i f 
n ot all , of Otto's weakness , is _is 11 bias . 11 The startling :point is th t 
he cknowledges it and even emphasizes it a integral with his purpose .102 
The direction of this bias takes him toward the refusal to a dmit t . e exis-
tance or metaphysical objectivity of values or ideals. T ere are s everal 
places were .e condemns an attitude of partiali ty . He says that the task 
in science is one of met od and no t of data ba sed on rigorously exact 
proof . Its aL sho'llid be 11 ob jective verification or freedom from i nvesti-
gators 1 wishes . wan ts •.. aesth etic., moral , or r eligious predilecti:ton s , whose 
... faith in or desire f r a par t icular conclusion (ha~ been c refully eli 
i nated as determining factors . nl03 Thu s , it appears , Otto is saying one 
thing and is doing anoth er . 
This biased attitucie is responsible for t _e following list of 
idea s w:1ic_ mi gl t be ques t ioned. 
First , Otto rejec;;ts the synop tic method . As he sees it , t L i ngs 
canno t be comprehended in t!1eir totality , and , therefore , any .ttenrp t to 
take life comprehensively is 11 mar.·ic beyond his powers . nl04 This position, 
a s it seems to the present wri ter , rev ee.ls a fundamen tal amb i guity . I f 
Ot to means by tot&li ty, 1. "all that it i s possi l e ever to lmov.r abou t an 
idea , or demonst.~able certainty. '' it is ap_parent , as Cha:pter II I i n this 
the sis has shown , that this is an i mpossibility. If , however , totality 
means, 2 . 11 all that is JlQ.Y1 known y the individual, or practical certaint 11 
102 . Ibid ., viii . 
103 . Ibid., 260 . 
104 . Ibid ., Vii . 
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there does not seem to b e a ny vali d. r e son for r e jecting the s~rno-p tic me~ 
t od sin c e synop tic thinki ng can a pply actually only to what is al r eady 
ev i dence a nd nothing else . It a ppears as t h ough Otto is saying becau se 
"totality l. il is i mpossible "totality 2 . 11 is also im::pos ible . Th is is a n 
illicit either- or and , if f ollowed. , 11 sounds like refusing to do ou r best . 111 
Secondly , ack nowl edgment of some source of experience ot. er than 
h uman is ad~itte ~ i n nature . The limitation of values or ideals s complet~ 
ly su j ective cannot logically ;follow i f nature is a source of valu e . 
Thirdly , social hedonism re sults from Otto' s moral relativism. 
~~i s ulti~~tely contra dicts his m?eal r el a tivism. If social o ~li ti on i s 
hi.;1 er t :b...an i n div i dual obligation , t _ere nn.,_s t be a criterion o jectiv e to 
h t:rr.ani t y . }To on e __ uman i ndividual is res-pon s i le f or the race nd cer-
tainl y t 'l:J.ere is no 11 s oci 1 n i nd11 who is _ i ,;;her au thority an yet h u1nan . 
boll soci .1 setbacks a r e , in th e la s t a nal y sis , traceable to the misdirec-
tion of indi vidual de sire s , eith er f or supposeC. advan tage of t h e g roup (o r -
f' E..lU Cl s;!l) o r fo r t h e imdividuals (atomism) . Socially, there must e a sur-
render of or ca nicistic desires for t _e en ef i t of eac _ e.nd a ll i n i viduals. 
Th is is th e element of truth in Otto' s hu.;!Jan:hsm . But, t h is su rren de r e.l s0 
eL1ands a nother surrender , na:nely , tha t of the i ndivi dual to h i g er-th n -
indivi dual criterion . This hi(!:h er- th an-individual criter ion must , t .. ere-
fore , be h i gh er t ha n ~~n and ther efore obj ective . 
Fou rt."h.ly , the athe ism of Otto is the cliw~x of the 11ei ther - or 11 at:.. 
titude of h is b ias . Ot t o .. ol d s to co smic atheism lar&;el y because of __ is 
refusa.l to b e synop tic a nd b ece.use h e rejecjrs t ' e objectivity of val ue . 
3: e obv i ously dislik es t e comr:on term 11 atheist 11 since he is quite particu-
105 . Brigh t man , POI , 66 . 
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l ar to state tha t he 'oes elieve in 11 ethical t hei sm. '' It seems t .a t v:-. a.t 
is neces .~ ry is no t il..ei.tl..J!.J:: natural science .Q.I: theistic religion ,11 but , '"'s 
f:a cin tosh s"';r s , 11 so.1e reasonable hi & er synthesis 0f the tv:o . ulOS Otto 
nee ds a little mo re co erence in his th oug·b t . 
3 . ,ecent P"hiloso .d ea l Thought : Theistic Conclu sion s 
i. R. Otto : i.!ysticism. 
1) Exposi tio:n . Tl'le concern of Rudol-p Otto is to s1 ow 
t .a t t .. ere is a. 1miqu e and autonomoc·~ s experience in r eli,: i on , essen tial to 
t _e e~:istence of rel i g ion as vrell e.s to. its dev e opment . ··; .ile -prb: r il, 
non- ra tion;;,l , t'hi s experience doe s not inclutie t .. J.e rcc t i one. l elemen+s in re-
u t 1.~.:n i t e s · .·i th the;:1 ~;·.!C'.ki n[ :pos sil)le an in tina te rel·.tions i p wit._ 
"'od. T ,e fo l loY:rins po ints repre sent t e salien t -:Deature s of h is t . 
First, belief is :poss i le onl y of rati onal conceptions . 'By rational , 
Otto n eans a t -ributes tha t ce.n be thour.:ht of concep t u;:;.lly , 11 clear a . • d ef- j 
ini te co ce:;?ts : [which] . . . can be g rasped b ;.r t he int ell ect ; they can e 
analyzed y t ought ; they even a.d.."'lit of efinition . 11 107 Th e possession o 
r o.. tioU.al conc eptions 1w Cl::L' istiani ty in lar;: e ;.n.u-:ibers and in uniqu e nlari ty 
is 11 a very real si gn of its suyeri ·')ri ty over religions of ot1.1er for!. s a n d 
at other levels . 11 100 But ration;; 1 conceptions do not exhaust the content 
o r elig ion . 
SeconC!l y , the m1min01c~ is the name Otto gives to the concep t of 
11 the 1oly . n This is without t he moral cl1aracter , in f a ct it s r a.tnonal c .. a!'"' 
acter a.ltoge t1er . l 09 This m.uni nous , then , is a. "unique ... category of val u e 
.. . perfec tly ~ .. ,.eneri.R a i.1d irre ducible to any ot:her ; and t . erefore , liJ e 
l Ot: . ;,:acin to sk , PRK , 135 . 
107 . R . Otto , .1 , 1. 
108 . Loc . cit . 
109 . ! bid., 6 . 
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every c•. · solutely prii.::ary a nd elemen tar;{ dE.ti.un , while it a dr.i ts of ei!lg 
discussed , it c.e.n not strictl;r b e o.efined . 11 110 
Tnird.ly , 'l'.' 1ile prirr.a.rily a datDJ , the lTu.minou s experience h as t h e 
element of cree.ture f eeli· .g which is itself 11 a f irst subj ective conco:-~1it£n t 
a n d effect of e.Dot11er feelL1'::!;-el:emen t , d.1ich casts it 1ike a shadow , c u t 
w ich ill itself indubi ta · ly 'has the Lu·nediate and pri n:ar-y reference to :n 
o )ject onts i de the self.';lll 
Hos t aplH0"9r-iate exqression of this idea h e can f i nd t o .esc_i e the e yper-
ience . Treuendun is clesccilJeo., t .oug:h ir.adequately . as .laving e . e ele~t1e1 ts 
of a wfulness or a ol·c.te unapproac'h.a lbili ty , the a solute overpoY:erins ness 
a nd ener~;y or ur,g-ency . ll2 LJrster:dnun is said to have t1e eleraents of the 
holl~r other probe. l y est described 1)y the sta te of lank a "'Ze.nen t , \'Ton-
cl er , stunor , 112= together with t'he eler!lent of sonet dng 11 ·11..niquely a ttrac-
ti ve e.:cld f af\c.inating . 11 114 The m;'{s teriou s thus possesses the dual q_uali ties 
o f the daunting a nd t .e fascine.ting v;hich 11 combine in a strange harmony of 
con trasts . nl1 5 
Fifthly , as a category of v-alue , the numinous reveals t: e relation-
ship of the self to the creator in the feeling of sin . "It does not s!)ring 
from t:he con sciousn ess of some co 1i ttecl transgression , but rat .. er is an 
i mr.iediate datum g iven with the feeling of the numen . nll6 Also , t .. e hol r 
m~.y 11 be recoepized as t hat vrhi ch conl!-na.nds our respect , as that whose real 
value is to e ackno wledged i nward1y . ul17 T:'lus , the numen , oro ject of 
the n~1inous eA~ecience , possesses U1e subjective value of fascinati0n a nd 
t'.:1e o jective _value of 1a u.t;ust 1 cr oblibation . 
110 . 1 1 3 . Ibid ., Ch . V. 
111. 114 . !bid •. 31. 
11 6 . Ibi . , . .~2- 52· . 
117 . !bi d . , 52- 64 . 
112 . llf . Loc . c i t . 
Sixt~1ly , t ~e numinous is a n ~ priori category. 11 Now t . is is the 
criteri on of a.ll .a .ru:iD.r.i LnrJ'v1l ed.;; e , na.mel.,- , that , so soon as an asser t ion 
c..s oeen clearly e::h.'})ressed an d. 1mderstood, knov;ledge of its trut' comes 
i nto the >.;i nd with the ,certitucl e of f irst l!.and i n sig:h t . ullB Also , there-
fore , sa;;rs Otto , the m..u,linous bring s wi t1 i t certainty of kno .rle c'g-e . 
2 ) Critice l Allalysis . The fo llo;ting efects may e ~o ted 
First , Otto is 1mclear a nd_ even contrao.ictory in .is a p!:)lic.:=;.tion of 
rational an o. non-rational attri bute s to the numinous . Ei s definition of 
rational as possessing '1 concepts .. . which can i)e g rasped b;;r the i ntel lect., 11119 
and is state:.nen t t 1at the nu,--:1inous is to be considered. 11minus its 1rationa.l 1 
as-o ect a.l tog ethe r 11 120 i rnply that no thin@.: a bout t!1e numinous can be grasp ed 
oy the ·'ntellect . Otto realizes that this is de.n,gerous for he sa~Ts t hat 
tholl€11 the numinous 11 elude s the concep tual way of understa.nding •.. {yet] it 
must be i n some way or other wi thin our ~:rasp. 11121 T'Dis seems to e as er-
ting that knowleo.ge can exist without concepts , tbat lmo·;ledge is i n tuited, 
or t .at 1mder certain condition s knowl e dg'e a~1d ex:perience a re ide.n tical. 
T _e positions of i n tui tioni sm an d epi st eu~o logical monism have already been 
discu ssed i n t h is t h esis a nd adeq_u.ate reasons have been g iven , it is belit'Vi 
for discarding t h em . Actually , then , anything t.1at Otto can say e.bo·o.t a 
-./ 
non- rational numinous would he.ve rational con tent . Thu s , it fo llo' s , t ere 
arises the question as to t 1e validity of a procedure w _ich eliminates co 
pletely the ratione.l elements in any experience and e:JroeCts to .1aVe a.ny t . i ng 
u a. Ibid.' 141. 
119 . Ibid .• , 1. 
120 . Ibid., 6 . 
121. Ibid •• 2 . 
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·whatever l eft ab out v< 1ich t o tal k . 
Sec ndly , t~1e ciea of rlpre t i spo si·tion'1 is sai d to be § ;;>riori r in-
l!ate i n t >:e nu;ni no'L·.S expel~ience . l22 ~ ov:ever , t e -ore•rious d.isc\J.ssion has 
shown t~~at t he attitude of p r edi sp osition is Pl"i..'wily volitional , a 1 set 1 
of t .. e ind.iviclual t0v·e.r~ ex9erience . It :ls t nte that experience ha s a com-
pelling q_lJ.ali t y , but this do es no t eliminate the f a.ct t!:.at t .ere m::.st e 
an a.tti tude t ol7ard t e object of tl1a.t eX.JPrience VI iuh t.'he person :ru.s t de-
ci de f or ~i mself . 
I 
T'n irdl y , Ot to s t ree.tment of the .£ ;;u:.ip.r.i a spect of the numinous is 
do-cb tfu l. The fact that the e x-per ience occurs , as ;netapb.ysical r efere:J.Ce , 
and subsequently gives vali d knowledge is not a statement of a nythi n g that 
i s l o.;ically necessary , for this is what a priori . . ean s. T. ere ma y be ex-
!Jeriences , _i n fact there are such , which f l,_l f il a.ll the r equi re:nents of 
vali d knov:l e(l~e for sone t L e . B1.·.t sudd.enl y new eviden ce a.ppears hich in-
vali&.te s the cor..ce:ption . Otto .. i tnself i riTC)lies at the outset an e:9istemo-
l ogice.l d.ualis , , but l a ter seen1s to hold a .onistic i n t ui tionist of a mys-
t:!.c&.l sort . T1: e conclu sion s of the previous c. a-o ters i n t .i s t .. esis }1 ve 
!:'!hovm tl: e incoherence of t h is ·position . 
The fo llowi n._:; ne r i ts of Otto 1 s thow,h t m.ay be wen tion e d.: 
Fi rst , Otto is larg el y in a 2:reernent with tl e cor- elu sions a r rh·ed at 
i n Ohepter II , na nel y , t hat experience E-nd eli ef are not to b e confused . 
11I t i s one thin~: to believe i n a r eality b eyond t 1e senses a nd another to 
have e:cperi e:·1ee of it also . 11 ·ZZ-
Second l y , t h e.t belief r e f ers to th e rational &.nd experience to .._ -' e 
n n- r a.tional is also a coherent explanation if it is ta.'k:en as a starting 
1""2 . Ibid. , 11 9- 120 . 123 . I b id., 147 . 
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:!J Oint onl:r . 
Thirdly , Otto's a dmi ssi on , thow_;?:1 contradi c ted elsewhere , of tl1e 
ratio n.?~l element in reli{;ious ex_9erience to,sether with the application to 
grovtth in r el i.;ious conceptions sho'IVs , t:1ouxh no t ac~rnovdedged. , the effect 
of be die.l ectic and t he i nfluence of !eE;el. 
Fourt.d y , t h e reference of' t h e w:n1inous to t h e objective source of 
I 
valuEf'ncl its re sul ting t h eism is the result of accepting all t.~e evidenc e 
a vaila.bl e withi n the experi ence and revisi ng tl e . h;ypot esi s to include i t . 
F i ft ly , the en1p asis u pon tfl.e reali t y- revealine nature of e:cperi -
e.ce is true if teken along wi t h t he e y~ stence of an objec tive source of 
value beyond t h e experi ence of it and t h e necessity of f i nding Ot".t what 
t hat Source is y means of cohe rent reason and belief . 
i i . Karl Ba rth: Revel a tion . 
1 ) Exposition . Th con t emporary movement i n t heology •t ich 
dis~lays an irrationalistic apProach to reli £,ious belief is best seen i n 
the worlt:s of Karl Barth . His thought shows an almost v iolent tendenc,. to 
eli strust not onl y ree.son but ev en experi ence as a basis for reli g ious e-
lief . n inspection of his thought fol lows . 
First , Barth is a supernatu r.s.l theist in his po sition . s sue_ he 
dogrratica.lly aff irms C~ od 1 s existence . He describes his nature a s who l ly 
transcenden t to t .e world (except in the advent of Jesus Ch rist , the Word, 
a nd consciencel24) . The world as it is is 1 ot God1 s work . l 25 
Seco:1dly , Bart.1 is likewise an 11 a n ti- hl.lll1a.nist11 i f such a word could 
be .usec1. Iv:an must have everything done f or him b y 8·od i f h e VJ01.Ud aunt 
124 . Barth , WGWl\'i , 9 . 
125 . Barth , ER , 38 ; cited in :;~acintosh , P:O.K , 338 . 
to an~rthing . Wi thov.t this a id, mc:.n is a compl ete f ilu.re . Thi s applies 
to hu: 8!1. reason 1 126 by whi c. he s ,ys ma.n :1ever see s the ctivine . l 2 7 It ap-
p li es to human ex.ne&i.fl.D.l<..e. · God ll n:ru.s t never 1)e ident ifiecl with anything 
wh ich v;e naae , or ex"l)erie:nce , or worship , as God. 11 12 ~is li~ewise 
i ncl uded as a gift of G-od . Faith is the absence of ac tivit~r ; i t is 11 quet, 
l ettinc G'rod speak wit:'li.n . 11 1~9 All hu.rr.a:'l activity is therefore wren€ . 
11 Yea , let Go d be h·ue , but eYery ne.n e. 1iar!11 130 
Th irdly , the crisis ha.ving been reached. a deci eion becomes aeces-
sary . l31 Since !:Jan canno t c;ive himsel f faith , God has reYealed t _e way 
to God in Jesu s Christ , But tha f ith which takes of this rsvele.tio:'1 is 
not the work of man ; it is the t·ift if ~od . l32 
Fou.rthl;y , ret;:r~rdin§:; revelation , Barth 1 s an ti-hurr.enistic attitude 
holds t:1at tl e Bi ble tells u s 
no "" hori we should talk to Goc1 but v:hc:. t h e sa.ys to us , not t!"> e 
ri g ... t relation in wr:l.ich Yle '•iUSt place ourselves to him, but 
t'he covenant which . e a s rr:ade y;i th all ,1ho a re br ~ 1 s 
sniri tu.al child.ren and wl1ich he h2:s seale once and for all 
i; Jesus C:b.ri st . 133 
lT o t everything in the Bible is the Vo rd of G-od, al L_ou.:,-- God does s9eak 
out of its verse s . l34 Even his t orical esu.s is virtuall;y inrlepend.ent of 
t he revelation of ""orl i n hi 11 . Barth is emphatic in his demia1 tl'.tat J esus'·, I 
II 1 II 1'7r.:, even is the object of rellg io·ns and uystica ex:rJerience . u·~ 
is ac}1ievecl by the followi nc: method. : 
126 . Ba rth , 
127 . !1)id .• , 
128 . B<:~i~th , 
129 . Earth , 
130 . 
0 
.., . 
ER , 2:31 ; cited in i·•·a.ci nto sh , P. , 338 . 
Y7GV'l1 , 25 . 
42 . 
St::lvati on 
Ibid.' 
131. 'Barth , ER , 242 , et passim; citeo. in ldacintosh , PR , 340 . 
132 . 
133 . 
lw4 . 
135 . 
D ..rt 
' 
"Bert 
' 
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a.rth , 
REV , 60 ; cited loc . cit . 
,/G , 123 ; cite d in h(ac i nto sh , RK , 341. 
'\'f::.v:-r..: , 1 0-1 32 . 
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This ~ way \'7 e en t er not by s:peecl nor reflec ti0n ;:1or re .son , 
~ut bj' bein~ still , by lis teni n:; to an d no t eil encincc t 1e cor -
sci ence v1hen we have '1ard.l ~r be~ 1.11 to hea.r its voice . \, 1en e 
l et conscience S}')eak to the nd, i t tells us not onl y t 1at t~:..e re 
is somet1in.; else , a riehteousness above ri s hteousness , 't al so 
. . . th t tis some th L_:; e l se for w!1i ch we long andwhic 1 we need 
is God. He is ri .;:ht and n ot we t •. • \! e may :9resentl y e rou::' ~ t to 
sLence nd vJi t h Lat will ·De,::in our true reder~tptio l;, . lZ 
2 ) Critical An l ysis . ·mong all the thin~ers in recent 
p iloso:phy none represents a view so completel;? irrational as arth . . e 
s ee~ s a-l most to make irration.,.li ty his criteri on . If coherence , there-
fo re , hcwinc been cl:asen a t':!e uo st s tisfactory criterion , is called 
1..1:9011 to ii1spect Barth 1 s tl1ouf:l1t , it would seera e.t first glance to e able 
to reta ii.1 almost not~.1in~ . But deeper i n spection reveals the f ct that 
Bart~1 1 s succes s is in sp ite of li s irrationality , not bee .use of it . The 
-fo l:...owing r:ill give a l'esume of the l ogica l problems in Bart' w ich re 
t rou l esome . 
First , Barth 's denit:.l of !1e ··.u:.lidi t~r of human reason l ocically 
e xjJend.ed eli sproves itself . ow ca_1 B:::~.r th even t ~ e u:n pen or deliver a 
l e ct·-re i f he !::;.'lows whe,t h e is oin:§.; is :erroneo~s? fe is i n tl:'. e pc sition 
of tbe s!~e ·~1 tic rho says he know s no thinc out i n so sayi ng refut2s himself . 
Bart~:1 cc.n >.one stl ;)' s a y a solutely notl:.ins abo·J.t (lod , the r:orl , ran , or 
r!jrt1~i n.;- else . 
Secondl y , Ea rth 's C:.enial of t1"e va.lid.i t y of e:;.:perience i s . re-
sul t of h is abhorrence of any thin&; hwt1an . From thi:s pla tfor;:n · t fo llo s 
Lat r.JB..n , no t ev en 3arth coul d never experience his l ost condition or _ is 
se.l vation either . Thu s no h one s t 'basis can. be ;iven for this Bart~Lan 
d.o ctl·ine . 
1 36 • Bar tl1, 1::'Gr:; .~ , 2.;,- :::34 . 
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tion , as so r, etlhing which :l. s 11 done for u s11 :" Go d , is a denial of ~1u:::a.n 
:E·reedom . T:··i s deni 1 :POses tl:.e very :pntent p roble1' of ho1~.' hur, c;.ni ty ever 
ece1ne l os t . I:f rnan couldn 1 t c'hcf')se , t11en God -us t 11av e c 1o en ·for 1:1i .. 1it 
It r1eans a well t at G· od. predestines v;_ om he ~leases , whic. is l.:m e t __ ic .1 
favori tis_ . This 1 ,akes : ca. evil , or at least arbitrary, not go od. 
Fourthly , if reden-;p tion depend s upon 11 bein.;" still , beint;· 11 b rou~1t 
to silence , " nd 11 listening11 to the revel ation , it is v er. stran..:.:.e to wit-
ness a :?erson who can do no t!1ing 2.bou t h is sslvat "ion still p t himself in 
.L~1e; p lace o""' rec:e ivi n t:;: it . Cerui.inly t:-iat iHtlC 1 is :pt..rt , if not t e :::2.j r 
p ar t , of the p0si tion of the 1';30sit-i-.,rr- _ e is tr~,rin:g to refute ! lso Barth ' s 
allusion to beint; brou..=_ht t o s ilence has a certain resemblance to Hirvana , 
Vihic:l is · . a.rdl ;y a Christian co 1c. ception . 
Fif t1 l y , the concep tio· l o: a "totally other11 Gn d is rea.lly ..illlti- .i.rle:-
_i..a:t..U; . It i s ceistic .l37 Be.rth 1 s concessi on t o theism i· t .. _e revelc.tion 
his '; lord is , practie: c,.ll~r spea~dng , only a technical ac~movrle c1.,::-ment . ,..'J 
is stHl f er off ever:. ir: t> e rev lations of Jesus Chri s t and the "Bi le . 
T:O.us , >-:-:hil e Bart:!:l is technicall~.r a. t~ei s t , h e is ::Jractically deist a n d 
a n a.s~1os tic one • . From ti1e sta.nd.poin t of reli c ion as define in this t__ 
sis , such deis,a ms.ke £ it i rr,:possi l e for r:1en ' to be reli0_-i01.1.s ec .use he 
ce.nnot entertain tl e attitude of elief' Ylhich is neces~ ry to t .e f unc t:i.on-
ing of relig ion . Barth posits the object of relig ious lm ow1edg e or t e 
Source o:': t .!.e hi gh est v::...h1.e h: t tak e s away the evidence of t _e.. t ob ject 
(experience) 6md the cmly method ~.ossib1 e to attdn lrrlOV'ledge (reason + 
·"'.J elief) . 
137 . Cf . Brieh t mEm , F OR , 146 . 
T'.nere are e;oo d feature s in :Earth 1 s thought which are overshadowed 
y lis irratioLalism: 
Firs t , :Bart h 's view of reason merely serve s as a re ino er of t'l"e 
fact t h e.t a ll hun1El.n reas:m i s incomolete a nd dependen t on r eality for its 
c ontent a nd that the products of all r eflection will nee d revision nd re-
revision . 
Secondly, :Be.rth 1 s depreciation of experience is also 8, reminder 
that experi ence i s no t all there i s , but , \nhile it is fact itself , i t re-
fers to reality , a n ob jec t , cause external to itself . 
T.b.irdly , the view of fait 1, :hen co nsi dered as~ ll!llli~ y 
God instead of actually ~-used 2' Go d , is sufficient to st i mulate men to 
real ize their o 'In responsibilities in rec;ard to ethical acti on instead of 
llowing: . '!en to si n wilfully. 
Fourthl y , redeiiy?tion considered a s compri sing t..'l-J.e ;,i llingness to let 
coC'lscience 11 speak to the end'1 may be i nterpreted to mea n a ·willi ngness to 
e coherent . At a ny r at e , redemption con s idere d as co1:.1:9ri sing .ruuJl reve-
l ation of C-ocl to nan _a.rui ma n 1 s belief in that r evelation is the on l y asis 
for a t 1eistic p ilosophy . 
iii. E . S . Bri f:htnan : Coherence . Coherence as a criterion of truth 
has been discuss e d earlier and r easons have been given for its accep tance . 
The relation of coher ence t o t_e ial ectic ofb ief h s also 
t o J e essential . ,_ f rel1 ~1on 1 ~ttempt t o co tact reclity or tbe source 
of t.L"'le hi@.·hes t val u e , t h ere is ev ery reason t o believe t-1~ t co~erence is a 
necessary e l ement in t l:.at attenrpt . E . S . I3rig __ t man, pro ably the mo st ou t -
s tandi nt; exponent of r eligious coh erence in co tempor ry phhlo s o:;?hical 
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1) Exposition . A repetition of e1e nature of coh erence as 
criteri on is :b..ardly nec es ss.ry at th id point . I nstead, a surv ey of t e r e-
su l ts of coherence in the thou6ht of Brigb.tw.nn would p roba l y ··e .tO re a -
vi sable . 
Bri['l1 t man 1 s v:orld view is a d~rnar:1ic system. It is an at t e.rpt to 
·e all-i nclusive and completel y coherent . Brightn:an is a qualit .tive 
istic rr:oni t . ~;ua.n titatively he is a ~;ersonalistic plu..ralist . Per sonalit, 
for tl:e qualit· tive monis111 . T'cl.e distinct ey.istence of many selves is t he 
asis for t:'ce qU8.nti ta.tive plura.lism. The :p erson is defined as a 11 sel f 
t hat is potentially self -conscious , rational and ideal. 11 138 God , t 1e 
B fi n i te-infini te11 person , is defined as : 
per sonal consciousness of eternal dur tion ; • . . an eternally 
active will, -.-:hi ch eternally finds, and controls ifhe Given 
''lit in evex·y moment of his e ter nal experience . The Gi v en is 
r::~ade 1xp of the eternal , UJlcrec.. t ed. lavrs of rea on [ logic nd 
Ir:e.then<ltical rele, ti on J .nd al so •.• equa.ll~· eternal nd. U."lcrea ted 
urocesse s of !lOn-rc:.ti onal co nsci ousness which ey..h i it all the 
~1 tLJe.te ua.li ti e s of sense OC>jects ( quW.~) ' d.isorc1erl y i ,:;-
:pul se s a :rid desire s , SU C e :::periences as }')e.in 1''.11d S1:\fferinf, , 
the :F'o r~tl S of s'}ac e a nd thie , and. v:' . tevE:lr i n G- od j.s t ,e source 
of s·D_r· evil. 139 
The f_.iv en is 11 eterna:l wi t .. in the experience of Go d ... nd •.. is not 
a l? roci.uc t of v:ill or creative activity . Hl4:0 'B ri gh t nen Lo l ds t1 t : 
a lthoU;g·h t ie power of •. . GO. 1 s l':i ll is l ind. ted by the Gaven , r -
f;1.:unents fo r t he o jectivi t y of ideals o-ive f rou .. l'ld. fo r t e po s-
tula te t he.t his will f or gooclness and love is unli. i ted ; like-
wise , h e is i nfi nite ... by .is unbegu."l an unending duration •.• 
by his i ncl usion of al l na t u re within h is exp eri ence •.. and in his 
w1lir ti ted knowl edg e of all that is , although 1:u::~an freedom a nd 
t'"'"' nature of the Gi v en probal)ly lin i t 1i s knowl edge of t 1e pre-
cise details of the fu t u re . l41 
1;1r. . Brigh trnan, FCR:. 350 . 
139 . I bid., 336- 337 . 
140 . Loc . cit . . 
1 41. t oe . cit . 
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Since -personality is epenc!.ent t.:pon conssiousness or er:?erience 
( with ;-:"hicl: it is synonymo-..1s) , 142 a n inte:r"9retat:i:on of all experience or 
t _e er pirical me t"_od is the met: o :Brig t man u ses to arrive at truth . 11 
experience , w_ et:rer human or divine , is foun. to have the t h ree elero.ents of 
activity , ratio nal for1 , a nd brute f act . l43 Th o ,:::·ht and t ling nre kept 
s eparate epi s temol o[i c.2.lly . 
Regard.in; 'r l ue , Bri~h t man holds that value is '1·whe.tever i •.. de-
sired . . . y a.n~" one a t anj- time . nl44 Values are c.efined b y ideals . 145 Ideals 
:'lave the dual fun.ction of causing valuesD.nc1. a lso of judgin ·' values . l46 
Reli :;-:ious ve.lues are not unique apart from the i n teryene tration of the ot._er 
VE' ues 1i 'ch it •.. our experience of rel i [; ion •.. ca..n e adequately appreciated 
o.n ~ u:.'lderstood. onl~T in -a living i nterrel a tion of c:..ll the values t ., each 
other , coalescing i n a livi .:;; v: _ole . 0 od is d.efined as 11 the Source n 
Conti nuer o·" Vc-tlu.es . 1 147 The best relig: on is ctefinea as 1 co-o"9era t :i.on 
VIith God and .ran for the real izati on of inclivid:i.k"".l anc o~ share values . 11 148 
It is v:hen ]righ t r.Jall 1 s val ue t ,.eor;;r is seen i n rel a ti on to his 
epi ste:nolo l Y C'.n :::~eta-p iysics that t 1e co:herP.nce ·of b.:. s syste 1 b eco aes p-
:parent . God is t_ e source e.nd conti nuer of val ue . Persons are created. for 
co- o:::>er&.tion v:i th Clod for the realiza.t:1..on of val ue . 11 exyerience ?ossess$ 
sii.:ilar cr...c r· cteri stic s . Knor·l e d£,e and val ue re achieved_ by coheren tl ~' 
extracti..1;~ the rational fonn f:com exp ri ence whic'l-J. has een. p l a ed t1'1ere 
:firEt in t} e experience of •:!·od ln the for:n of norms or icle.?.l s by 'I ich Ol1r 
v&lues ;::.re t o ~ e jud.z ed. The i s tic fini tism is ~Jai t inet e.s the onl y c0-
} erent e:~.91 ne.tion of thE f cts of exp rience , the evil fe.cts s well as the 
142 . :Bri r.:~htman , POR , 227 . V,6 . Loc . cit . 
143 . Ibid., 3L . 1 47 . I bid., 203 . 
144 . Ibicl ., 88 . 1 48 . Ibid., 425 . 
. 145 . I i 
·• , 91. 
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2 ) C ri ticc.l Analysis . :Brigh t n·.n 1 s con clusions , s ' ,z.ve 
'l:;e en here }Jr~sented , illustrate the mos t s2.t isfc ctory syster:< thu .~. ar con~ 
s i d.ereC:. . Coheren c e 1"'E. s been th aim . Coherence l1a s been tl::.e result . Yet 
co"1erence d.oes not w.ean a static syste.- i:mt a developing one . T:1 · s is cer-
tai nl y i:T1?1ied. continuousl y in I!ri ,;·:htma...rJ. 1 s t!wught . It is a f~ith t "' t 
.. oral a. cl''.1.evemen t must b e the ~~ od of huma n living plus a n 10nest inves-
t· ~ation of a ll the facts i n t he case . IJ.1he Leor;,r of t hei stic fini t is:.,; 
\; 
is one which :!oul o. w.1 "ou~edly hel p 1ra ny ::;er·son s , otherwise prevented by 
e xperiences of evil , to bel ieve in t .. e exi stence of 6d . However , i :tre pee-
t:i.v e of all f'r..eor ies , t h ere iE. one f act that is supremel ,:r important . T'na t 
is tl1e .:ainta inanc e of t 11e atti t1:tde of religious belief . All t~1eo ries r e 
·u~J j ect to revision . In t..~e f inal a naly sis it is t he attitude of 11 co-
operatinn , i1 c-, s Bd ghtme.n say s , which is the cn,_cial po i n t . 'i' .en an, t.e-
o r y , a ' solutistic or fi~·liti stic , gets in the vra y of cOinnitrnen t to "'') d , 
t~.1a t t'·,eory "''.O"cl l cl 1.;~ though t f ·c.lly but f irml ;y· qu estion ed . 
The conc l u sion s of tl-J.is chapter rro.;.s t be viewed as a w~1o l e . T:he 
most a cva..."'l tag eous way of do i n,:: t}:·:is is _robabl ;:l , i n 2.11 i n te :-rate· for::1 , 
to viev; t~-:.e conc l u s ions reached in t ... i s c:hapter in co r:~bination .'i th the 
p ev i oue o.iscu ss ion 0f lmowl edge , truth and ·belief . The :t1ext :"apter is 
devo teet to t.1i s t asl a i.10. l' e:;re sen ts t1::.e a tterr::9t to test the ~al i it: . f 
the l ot:i cal ba se s t hus f a r f ou:c! O. in reli:=;ious elief . 
CF TJi:R V 
THE LOGIC OF R!i!.IGI GUS BELIEF 
T_ e progress of this t!lesis he.s b een traced frow t h e <r esti:;n , I s 
knowledg e of :reality po ssible? to the question , ow ma;~r knov:ledg e be j u n·e 
true'r From t h ere t..l-J.e element of elief becar e i nvolved a nd the questi on s 
a ros e : What is the pro cess of findi ng knowledge ? and , How is the p e r on 
r elated to that process? It was found tha t knowledge is dep enden t upon e-
lief . Also , it was f ound tha t b eliefmey:follriw a dial ectical pa ttern which 
ai ms at a co .eren t 1iL"l d.erstanding of experience . 
l~ e t the i dea of value r:as i n sp ected and a certai n resemb l ance of 
values to oth er reality was observed . Both require su jective apT)recie.tion 
a nd both h ave objective :ref erenc e . Further , bo th of t~ese ele:nents are es-
sentiB, l to a coherent 1.mclerst.smdinr of the facts of e xperience . 
The thou[h t of s ever a l recent philosonhers was t:hen exami n e rl . I n 
the first , or natur alistic , or ath eisti c , ;::roup , factors wer e observed whi ch 
see· .. to po i nt tov:ard t'1e sonrce of value eac beli ev ed to be u1 ti l · te . 
def i nite arran~·emeut oft eil· p~ilosoph'cal po sitions coul d e Jade 0::1 the 
basis of t *eir cho ice of the so u rce of hig!J.est value . In the second .::_ rou: , 
e.J. l of the men repres en t ed v:ere th eists . They also present ed evidence fo r 
w*_e.t they b elieved. to be t he so'..lrce of va l ue i n their theism. However , each 
of t11eir vi ev:s is co~1cerned v:iUl a met~oCi or VIa y of knowi n~: t . e _ ighes t 
res.li ty- - or •Joel. 
It is the pm~pose of thi s c~a.pter to b ri ne to ;:et1er t - e se eler:1ents 
tl:.1:,s fa.r presented into a logica l iy coheren t sy s tem, based on the s truct re 
of dialecti c . lT'h.e ai m is t o discover whether there is a logical basis fo r 
r eli #;:ious b elief . 
:Before -pro ~ressing to the syn t h esis of t hi s cliscussion , it is a.d-
v isab l e at this point to gi ve a normative d.ef i ni tion of religion . Reli gion , 
normativel y , ouLh t to 'be : belief i n the will of G.coo. as the h i ghest uossible 
value , toget 1er with i ts irrro1i ca.tion s f or t 1e reali zati on of indiv id1.cal 
an d social values . This definition i s not intend.ed to impl y any static con-
c ep t ion ; what is i mplied is corrmmnion with God and. cooperation with hi 1 · n 
his purpo se • .It is a hJ.<"})Ot'.e sis to be tes ted by the evi dence thu s far ga -
t here d . If it can not be shown to be coheren t, then there wil;t. be reason 
to acce:pt some other view . I f it proves to be coh erent , or the best tat 
can b e express ed i n view of t e fa ct s of experience, there will be logical 
eviden ce suppo rting religi ous belief . 
1 . First Stage of t h e Dialectic 
i . Thesis : Hedonism: (Religious Sk epticism) . A recent eL_Pression 
of the philo soph ical value t heo r y knov.-11 a s h edonism was found i n the 
t11o1J.[';h t o f Bert:cand Russell. Pleasure , or happi ness , according to this 
t _ eory , i s the highes t val ue . But , it r,ms t be r emembere d. , thi s S:.'lould be . 
a j ud.c-men t- or knowleege- claim sinee no i n specti on of r eality or val ue 
shoul d proceed. wit ou t some asserti on or denial to t e s t . If the t .esi s is 
accepte d as true , as a certainty, without f1.rrth er testing , the dialectic 
is stoy,:- ·0e d b ecause of creduli ty , reli gi ous a.tti h1.de is abandoned , a nd. 
1 . Profe s sor Brig:'ltma n 1 s 11 dialectic of desire11 ( Cf . "PCR , 251- 258) 
is a no st satisfactory app lication of the princi-ple . Its useful nes s i n t _ e 
development of this the sis i s fundamental, and h ereby is g1•at efully ac-
knowl edged . 
JO 
he .onism beCOl:leS COmpletely atheistic a no. irreligious . !+' the thesis , ho .. -
ever , is accepted tentatively , an d. believeC. , with all t hat word i mplies , 
the concept of heo.oni sm can 1Je consi o.er ed descr:ip tively religious . Ho r ma -
tivel~' , however , as is seen i nP.us s el l 1 s thout;h t , it is far fromw. t t .. e 
normativ e ef ini tion ".emand . Therefor·e , .ecloni sm, consi dered nor:na. ti vely, 
· is relig ious skepticism. 
il . Antithesi s : Experience of ense Data . Belief , t en , allO\'.' S in-
spection of new evid.ence and i s t1,e condition essen tial for rel i f iou s livL 
i.'7 .':!.tu:r~l ly enoug 1, tl e onl y Wf!.Y to o te"in pleasure is trough ex:; eriences , 
experiences of sensation . But o.fter a few sensa,tions , it is discovered t . a t 
all s en sation i s not plea sure . Ru ssell say s some th · n~s e.re " di sgus ti n _s}12 
.A ppl icati on of the coherence cri te:don reveals , then , that there e.re ""acto, 
Russell 'Vas f orced to I 
.. oclify :b.i s atomistic hedon ism f or a more '1 socia111 • • e doni sm, aving located 
in sense data that are i ncoherent with pleasure • 
t .c e sourc e of t'.is pleasure in t1:.e 1 .. d g erH concept of '1:persons a nd .L~ing s . " 
iii . ~~: lra turali sm. The h i g)1er ~appiness , although found. 
i n u ersons a nd. t hin6 s , do es no t mean , owever , t.~t t . ey a re a nything ot er 
than _hysical a nd c .. emical p 1eno .. 1ena to Rus ell . :But it ·oes 1 a n t .• at 
Russell ha found th.e SO"\..U'Ce of pleasm·e -n "!)hysical reali ty. R6gar Q.ess 
o f the correctness of Ru ssell's i nductive theory, it see:1s co_ erent at this 
stag e to say that pl1,rsical thin.ss a F: tl1e so1u·ces of experiences of sensa..-
tion ~1d thus of the value of pleasure . P ossession of physical thing s is 
the sin:plest means of i nsu rin;; satisf action of pleasure . Thu s , t e a nti -
2 . Russe ll , l i B , 34 . 
thesis of sense data unites 11ith the t hesis of pleasure in the s~rnthesis 
of naturalism. 
2 . Second Stage of the Di ·lectic 
T'l.esis : £raturaH.:;sl (Religious Doubt) . Jlaturalis11 has been 
g iven a modern treat ent at the hands of Sell~rs . His interest center 
not upon ple .sure z.s the seat of value but instead upon :physical reality. 
All there i_ is physical or hr'o.s t e 11 physicalized. 11 :But natur lism. as r 
presented by Sellars . is little more concerned with reliE,i.on a s no . -
tively defined t _J.an w s Russell. But . it is at least ,.ore coherent th n 
hedoni£m, and. therefore . ma.y e classed properly nearer the goal ; o.oubt 
directed toward rel igion is mcSre l'eligious than indifference. n so far 
as na turalism mai?lt ins the rnininn.m1 derna nc.s of religious elief . it rr.? .. y 
e considered descriptively religious . 
ii . Antithesis : Experience of Con equences . Th mi ni r.rum re ... u.ire-
·l!i ent of religious belief 1::eing n:e-'- . it ecorne s evident to t ._e eli ever in 
n turali sm that all e:A."!Jeriences of :Jhysical redi. ty bring experiences of 
consequences . All ph;ysical tbing s do no t bring the sa. 1e sensations ut 
v:idel•r diff'ering ones . Also , - they bring different _z:rades of pleasure . 
ellars _12-S shovm his eversion to static ein~E; as have other wri ters . 3 
Tbus it 'ecor. es ev i den t t t for thing s to have val ue t_1ey r:-.us t be dealt 
with . t ey must be in terd.ependen t . tl~ey r,ru.st produce consequ ences . 
iil. Sy-.at~ : Pragn tism . Phy sical things , therefore ; ecor.e 
2 . Borde • . Bowne a s g iven an excell en t refutation oft e conce~ 
tion of a static Bei ng in his MET , e specially Part I . 
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valueless , if not 1:.e' int .less , ""PE'~rt f rom t eir relation~ to ot . er -p .ysical 
thin,;~s a nC.. their a. ili ty thereby to produce consequences which are vahted. 
S ellar s 1 va.lue theory , which is cotnpletel y volun tari stic~ poin.ts directly to 
pra~~ati sm . Thus tile antithevis of the xperience of consequences unites 
with tl e thesis of ne. turf'.lism to :prod1Ce the new conception pragmatism. 
3 . Third Stage of t~1e Die.lectic 
i. .Thesis : Pr=grne.tism (Reli g ious 0!)bion ). Activity is e. 1::.ost i rr 
porta.nt conce:ption in the search for the source of va ue . T, e g reat influ-
ence of Dewey is 6.ue i n l.rg:e part to the truth in .is thesis. u t , li~e 
all ot. er clai:Tls , it mus t be subjected to t . e umbli n~ tti tude of reli-
gi0"t.J.S belief if it is t<J neet the s;tandard . In so far as its a ren ts 
ave this a.ttit"t.1.de t !1ey may q_ualify s religious in t ll"'.inil:.lUl:: sense . s 
re;...e,r s t:'1e nor!!'' of relig·ion , :prag. ti.sm i£ still f ar from the fold , ut it 
is sti1 1 on the vmy . It may, L"'1en , . e classed as religious o:pinion ; opinion 
directed tO\"ie.r r~ reli gion is :nore reli c iou s than doubt . 
ii . · ·i thesis: : :Bh:perience of erso11a.lity. The valuing of activi t;r 
alone is ha.:cdly frt.l:i.tfu.l . The valuin€ attit e is concerned wiL t le s.ource 
of ac tivity . i'!"b...a.t is it that can act? \'fna.t is it that can appreciate .c-
tivity? \il1at is it t hat though it acts or change still remains the s~ne'? 
The only ans>ver to thes~ questions is furnis led. y t_ e r:once-pt of personal-
ity. Onl y persons can e the source of' ve.lue e xperienced as ac tivity or 
consequences and only persons can !'a nifest ap-preciation of that activit:,.· as 
val1 .. 12.ble . Value , thei1 , is trul y personal. 
iii . ~thesi s : Humanism . Thus the search for valu e is lift e 
to the level of human personality , to the s ocic.:-1 level . ·_ere t "-e ve.lues 
of life are vastly expanded as wel l as el evated . Social experiences o f 
res~ect f or o thers , mutual enjoymen t , and the exalting experiences of love 
4 
,ake the search for value take on a more mes.ningful aspect . · Thus the 
a n tithesis of' persona.lity unites with the thesis of humanism to create a 
new so1.:rce of vah:e in humanism. 
4 . Fourth Stag e of the Dialectic 
i. Thesis : Hurn::mism (Relig ious Belief) . In human ism there i s 
reached the highest concep tion that the ne.turalist will admit . All t -e 
nature.li sts discn ssed thus far a re hu:w.n ists to a gr eater or les s degree . 
Humanism is t he naturo.li st 1 s 11 the:l sm11 a lthough he is careful net to u se 
t h e vrord 11 worship" ; hmna n beings are not to be worshiped , they say . Th e 
social welfare is the hi ghest source and ob j ect o: value ; it is the end of 
the search . 
But wait . T say 11 th€' end11 is to violate the mini mum reo.uirernent 
of reli gious belief , namely; unbiased recep tivity to new evidence and co . 
mi t ment to the revised hypothesis . The search must go on . If the attitude 
of elief is maintained at t h is point , humanism may -be classed as relig ious . 
If the humanist 11 gives up the ga , e11 as clo es ·~ax Otto , his source of value , 
judged. b y the norm of relig ion , is merely a, relif.iOus 11 beliefi1- -belief in 
this case referring to a more or l ess substantiated f act but pos ses sing no 
certainty' e.tev er . If , however , he continues to Hplay the ga me , n he rr>.ay 
be cal l ed reli gious b;y the minimum standard. 
4 . B ri l:-h tman , POR , 25:':.- 254 . 
ii . Antithesis : Experience of :i:~o~ms . In social intercourse it 
viill be fo1md that there is really no val ue obtained unless there is a 
value to share . It is o 'Vi ous tb.a.t merel y an aggregate of ::oersons is tl'1 e 
concH tio CJ. f or the e},_-yeriencing of Yalue. but it is not t.~. e value itself . 
When t~1 t a 6gragate of persons becomes a 11 societ;}~1 when it live to c ether 
in harmony a.:.'ld i n accord, it is thell that v$.lues are exper i enced. Thu s 
th e _ umanis t is faced with the fact thc\ t :no ma tter h ow much he ma;)r t __ i n.'k: 
social vr lues and hulntm culture are all hi s , it is actuall;r not the caee . 
There is c.o ste.ndard or a norm which he e::rperi ences as necessary to t _ e re-
aliz~ti on of val ue s . If goverament ~~d law mean anything , they m~an that 
they a.re other &.11an hume.n bei ng s and other than society no. e.lso 11 hi g _er 
than11 both of these . 
iii. SyntlJe s:i.s : Theism. HO\" is it possible to satisfy the de-
mands of both the thesis a n d!: the anti thesis? If the source of all va,lu e 
must be personal a.nd yet no value can be realized unless t here is a value 
to be irr:partecl which is objective to tnose sharing it , there must e sot:1e 
reality capa. le of f ulfilling these demana.s. Thi s reality is found .lon e 
i n God v.r.._o :ts t "?. e i1 objectiv e -, uriion ~ ··· . of" ideal ·a nd personality . 
The concep ti on of a Supreme P erson , t::,ui ding the universe by its io.eB.ls is 
t he coherent and inclnsive inj)erpreta. ti on of the whole range of value ex-
:perience .115 
5 . Briehtrr~n , FOR , 255 . 
5 . Fifth Stage of the Dialectic 
• rm. • Th . ( R 1 " . ~ . t• ' 1 . ,j,,DeS:tS : elSffi . . e J. f'; 10US ., onVlC 1011) . The synthesis just ~re-
sente" is no proof of God. Na ny ll proofs11 have been given in the istory of 
l)hilosophy , out in tire theyare e.ll disproved i n one vray or another . If 
it is t~our.;ht ott as e, -proof , the reli gious atti tude is a·ban<loned . If it is 
thoc:.c:h t of as the new stt~rtinc point fo r new ex·:~erience , t hen t. ere will 
co ::~e n ev: es :perience a cl a more · coherent conc eption of tl:e source of valu e 
'.Vill re ..:u l t . This l)OSi tion t~1en can be evalue. te . i n relation to the norma-
tive .efi nition of relig ion as relig iou s conviction . C:.~od is . Conviction is 
the natural result of the acquiescence to the existence of (}od. J3ut this 
conviction is not a credulous one . It is based upon evidence furnis ed in 
exp erience . 
J3ut mere affirmation that Gocl i s is not suffic ient. I n the previous 
c a -p ter the thou.~·ht of Kar l Earth we.s inspected.. B:is vi ew of (} :)d is that 
he is , •ut man can never know him, can never experience him. He is t otall y 
other . This creclulous attitude compels the theist to ceas e t_linking at the 
point of t h eisn, the thesis of the :yresen t dialectic , and kes hi a dei s-
tic sup erna turali st . He has the conviction of God, but it is a completel y 
irrationa l o;1e . i . en this is don e , it takes away the personal charac teri s-
tice of God tha.t Vlere a.ssi&:ned to him in the sy:n t hesi s of norms , a nd p erson-
a.li ty a nd reduces C·od to a law- ma.ldng r;x=tc_ ine incapabl e of ap:precia tins any 
huriJ&.r_ va.l-ne whatsoever . 
n the other han c. , mere ap:9reciation of the inco 1erent value of a 
nurr,i n ol.1S experien ce is not sufficient a l one . This conception of Rudol:9h 
Otto , whicl:. was a l so exa1 ined L-1 the previous chapter , takes h ol d of the 
:personality end of the dialectic a.nd makes myst:i.c:·-·1 u_nion or relationshiu 
idee su:preme , a nc cti srege..rds , at lec;.st in t...e conce])t of the s 31riori na-
ture of the .uminous , t._e necessity of rational norms e.nd coherence . This 
is a l so e. cred1.llous atti tud.e and eliminates the el ement of obli F:ation . S 
Yr.t'lE,t then is to be don e if the lJeliever in God is to ua.inta.i n is 
attitude of belief an _ look for the source of the highest value? Coherence 
e.e·ain ~~s the answer . 
ii . .A.ntithesie: : E:xperience of the \.fill o-g :rod. If G0 d is oth 
personal e.n .. no r mative , there S:-.cul'd be a relE.tionship of his nerso i1a.l !latu.re 
e-nd 1:· s nor re.tive nature . It has a.lreao.y been sug~~este _ that thi s is ac-
co-.:T!)lis}led b~r Go<.l ' s 11 guiding11 the u..11iverse by norms . This is the clne 
tb<'- t i s ne ed.ed . Gocl , a.s Su ,r eme £.erpon8.1i t;t . 
aceordiw' to -~i s stand.t?.rds . If this were not t e ce..se, the norms woulcl 
never become availc:; .. l:l l e for mE.n to val u e . But how can i.m .n know ho rr the \'~ill 
of G- od .irects hL1 . . fal .. 1s t search ea.rnestl~r for a nd test evid :1ce co· erent 
l ~r , always n:aitrtailili:lg the c;. tti t ude of , elief . The a.tti t ud.e of elief never 
sto-;Js if L£.11 is t ·j maintain his reli.:c. ious life even t _ ou~h tJ::. e l:'! inLxu·J COi1-
di tion i::: c.11· t _Et is fu~fille d by it . ~mnst :cdate h:is iP.' est ya.h1ef 
iii. S;trnt 1e si s : !ni tia.tion of Sni :citLV:'-1 Life. (C ertainty) . The 
pro lem of certain t;y nas eli scussed_ at length in Cr.ap ter III . It was 
fo·und that , while the resc.•.lt s of' coherent investi gation v:ere only rela-
tivel y cert<.~in , the commitment of the '9erson to the coherent lz; ort:aniz c~ , 
. Although Otto b.olO.s to the ~)re sence of such an enti t;r in the 
numinous , it con tra.dicts the conception he also holds t hat truth is intui-
tively obt ined. 
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eYalu c-.ted, a nd revi sed -~.ypo thesis wa.s , pra ctically speaking , certE:.in . 
From the standpoi n t of value , now , it would. be profl to. l e to see 
hov; this idea may be appli ed to the idea of the ·will of G-od. T L8 v:i lJ. o 
G·od is b eli eved to b e directed t oward the realization of t _ e h i gh e st po s-
s ib l e indivi dual and social va lues . This i s contained L1 the :r:orn'.ative 
/ 
de finiti on of reli f; i on . I f to t"li s t h esis or norrrE-tiv e de fin i tion (whi c 
represents relig ion the way God wants it) :l.s a doed the antithesis of man ' s 
complete a nd tmhesite.ting co:mmitmen t , t !.e resul t , or s;rfl thesis , will e a :1 
i11itiation of spi ritual life . At tl'lis point c.JB.n has do ne all th t __ e can to 
f i:'ld a coher ent source for all t h e values :1.e cheri she s . I n the r . cess , it 
is true , ;iJany val ues have 1)e en discarcecl as uxJ.worthy . But new valu e::; }1 ve 
been discovered e.n C. new ligh t @'iven l!ecause l'l".all has f ound the source of them 
al l . Spiri t UB.l li fe , i m:pa.rted to man ~ Gocl on the condi tio~1 of r.."an ' s com-
wit:nen t , is a s nea r absolute ce r tai n t y as it is ~;o ssible to get . 
But t _J is new l ife is not static-..- it is alive , alive to n ew evidence 
tY'· t Gnd rca .,r give t o i ndicat e his wis:1.e s or purposes , h is concern or is 
l ov e . It is pE,r t n ership wi t.h God in a racial objective- -it may b e called 
the king dom of God . 
CH T~R VI 
SUL.-,..!;.RY AlTD THESES 
The problem o:f this t'!.1esis , as s t ated in CJ:-,a pter I , was to inves-
u ~~;ate and. :r- e:\ .1te tl1e c~"Jc..rge Of rnatLlr?-listic t hou g .. t that reli giou.s belief 
i s i :crelevan t to the f acts a nd va.lue is incapable of s e;:-1 s o r~.r o s ervation . 
The aim of this the sis is to show by an inve st i ~_'E.:,tion of recent .._.;h iloso-
p ical t hOU€h t that the fact s 0f experience a11d st r ic,, adheren ce to l or;ica.l 
1et.1od do no t warran t suc~'l co. elusions~ 0n the contr·· ry , r el i g ious elief 
is to l e demon stre.ted e,s .avinE:: certain v ery defini te l ogical ases for its 
f oundc,tions . 
T'he fo llowing theses are p r esented as evid.ence for this con clusion : 
PRESUPPOSI TI .,N' 1. SOI:Jethinr:, exists in hu:·,an expel'ienc e V.'hich u sually bring s 
val ue t o its 1)a.rti cipan ts • . 
PR'ESUP· OSI TIOJ.T 2 • .A. t lea t so '1e kno"VhdE:e is pos sibl e ; ]:"lure skepticism is 
self-con tracl.ic tory . 
THESI S 1. Knowledr e is cle:r_)end.en t upcm a knorer , an object known , and a : r::> -
cess of knowi ng . 
T~~SIS 2 . 1:o knowl e dge is po ssib le u.n ess a ,juc1g, .e .t ismade in the form 
of a:n as sertion or o.en'ia l rezarCJ i ng the object knovm ~r t. e 
knowe r . 
Tb.e object is bes t fo·u.nd trul~r r epr esent e6 i.n the ju<igment 
~::!]llication of t~1e criterion of c oherence a nd t e d.ialectic . 
•T ,, 
TH:E,SIS 4 . TLe subjective condition necessary for tl1e dialecti cal test i ng 
i s bel ief-~ o1· t ha t -:.1nique attitude of the conscious ljerson toward 
t h e truth (o r f alsity) of 8..XlY !mov.'l ed#.' e cla.i1n v1hich i s l1'19.nifes ted 
i n a prel i mi nary attitude of 1.mbiase cl r eceptivity to the evi C:.ence 
a vc:..ila'b le , ai1d t h e su .... sequent attitude of conm.1i t men t to t>at 
cle ... in1 . 
:.? 9 
======~==================~======~================~~--~~r ~~ 
=====if==============-~=-=-=-=--=-====~~~-- --·=========#==== 
THESIS 5 . Tl:e at titude of elief is not sta.tic , but is a dynamic princi-
ple of reorganization of the f acts ·':l f e:cperi ence into a coherent 
a nd li vin::: uni tJr v:_ ic 1 follov1 s a dialectica l 1;attern i n its 
search f or truth . 
T' _:;liSIS f. . A val ue !,Jay b e defined as any e:x:perience or supposec.1 source of 
exper i ence tr...at :is believed to point toward the solu tion of a ny 
::;n·oblelp. 
TEESIS 7 . A tnte value is a: .. w value that has been tested dial ectica.lly 
(coheren tly ) . 
T: ESIS 8 . The mo st coherent val ue t heory is one that hold.:s: that values 
:cequire both subjective appreciation and. objective validity fot 
thefur existence . 
THESIS 9 . 3.elig1on (religious belief ) is belief in the sou..rce of experien-
ces which are re[~arded as of su;n·eme val u e , belief e in_: under-
stood. as compri sin:2.: the at ti tuo.e s of unbias ed rece:pti vi ty a nd 
commitment to ex;_u eriences o f t"i:'.e highest value tog:ether ;..-i th 
their i:!Iplications . This is a nrl.n i :m.1.-rn d.efini tion . 
TEJtJSIS 10 . Relig i on norlP.at ively c ondd.el"ed is belief in the v:ill of 3-od a.s 
t e highest possi Jle value to gether with :L ts i mpli cat ions ofor 
the realization. of i ndividual an so~ial VLlues . 
TEESIS 11. T:!:e value theory of h e donism , judg e d norma.tivel y is reli g.;irms 
s!::epticis.;u; judged descriptively , it is r elig ious . 
T!IESIS 12 . The val ue t eory of naturalis n results from h e donis i"hich !::tain-
te..ins a mi n i nn.:un definiti on of reli r; ion . 
r.['}~ES ·~ 13 . T:he value theory of pragmc~tism , norrr.a.tivel y reli g ious opL1.ion , 
resul ts fro!. naturali sm which .aintains a minimum. definition of 
r elie;ion . 
TB:ESIS 14 . The val ue theory of hu.manism, normatively a reli gious uelief , 
res-u.l ts from ~Jrag .. ti~m which rnainte.ins a ,_i n i mum defi:.:d ti on of 
reli .;:;ion . 
Tl1 ·siS 15 . The value theo ry of theisr:.1 , nor:matively relig ious conviction , 
resul ts from humanism, which ;·,1£.int.,~ins a. •ilini mum definition of 
relig ion . 
T:rESIS 16 . The i n itiation of spiri tuaJ. li fe is the res1..u tant v:hen the 
normative clefi:rlition of relicion , i ~nplicit in theisru. , uni tes 
wi tl1 the descri-ptive d.efL1i tion of rel:l g ion or the : u;Jan appr0a ' . 
th the Source of the hi t:{~! est values . 
.:1-:B S TRA.C T 
The pro'b le rr of this t he sis is to inve sti ~ate the logic.?.l ases f r 
reliGions 'belief . The ch arge of naturalis~il h2-s ~)een that tr'=' di tio 1al re-
li z ian is outworn and out_z;rown . This c: .. :=:r :::;e is a c1allen.r>;e , a~1C. is !-:: e reby 
8.cce:pted. The r- ethod used. in this thesis is a com ination of the e1:.pirical 
a nd t:1e di~lectical. Re ce .. t p .. dlosophical tho' ~~1'c is the source of t~-e con-
tent , al ~1ough the thou_:;) t of -·egel i s fcma.a.tental to t1e nethod. 
T~1 e presuppositions of this t>.esis a.re : 1) Somethin~:; exists n hu-
m< n experi ence which usually rings val ue to its pa.rticipahts , an 2 ) at 
l east some knowle -' ";e is possi le ; pui~e s)::epticism is self- contradictory. 
T. e &:eneral :plc.n of the thesis is lirst to investigate Le ~mow.:.ng 
p rocess episte.nolo,-J' icdly and to establish a c:ri teri on of trut a n a , e t h-
od b~r ··:~1 ich to arrive c. t true conceptions ; s econd , to investi te t _e 
thought of recent philosophers , naturalists and theists ali:ce ; nd third , 
to eva.l1:a te the evidence thus given in the ligh t of thP- criterion . 
Tl1e structure of kn')wl "ed§;e is found. to con tai n the elemen ts of 
1 ov:le" e a. lmower , a n ol)ject , and a process of knowing ) , t e ual ities 
of truth and error , and al so a conditi on necessary to the a.c ievement of 
knor.lecige . 
An inspection of clifferin{::; vi mvs reveals evidence for t"b..e acceptance 
of e:Piste ological dual ism, t h e a do::>tion of t..h.e col1erence criterion of 
truth as expressed in the dial ec tic , and. t _ e ctiscove:cy t b .t c:m a.tti t ude of 
be ief , or unbiased. recepti t y to evidenc e given in experience , and comr:.1i t -
ment to the implications of the evidence is essen t ial to the achi everr:ent of 
k:n0wl edge . 
1 
n analysis of elief reveals that there is a dialectice.l structure 
vli t h in the lmowing process itself . The fact is found t~1at untested accep-
tance and. untested rejectio~1 of evidence gives di"' _o nest l:nowledge , or cre-
dulity . The concl u sion that olJ jective certainty is i1rrpossible , ths.t rela-
tive c erte.inty is unnecessary , but tY.lat practical certaintJ7 is·desirab l e is 
reach ed. . 
I n relation to val u e theory belief is as i mportant as in a..11 y other 
f ield of i nvestige. tion . But belief is fo-_md to be merely the co ndition of 
find i ng true conceptions . Belief mus t b e applied to vc..lues in order to 
fi nd the source of values since onl~- the sou rce of values g ive any a ssur-
?..nce t"h.at t .. ey will. be a vailable t o t .e ~oerson . 
Th e investigation into the t1oU€~1t of recen t philo sophers revealed. 
a ~ias in favor of subjectivity of value on the ;)art of the PJ3.turali sts and 
o jectiv i t y of value on the :?£Ort of some t hei sts . The fo r ·.1er stuC.ied is 
conpo sed of B . R'lilssell , R . Yi , Sella.1•s , J . Dewey , a nc1 . .':.C . Otto . T!le t h eists 
studied are R . Otto , K. Barth and. E . S.Bright man . Both E:,rou..-J s are ehosen 
fo r t .. e Y:i dest divergence of view as wel l as for their i nfl ue __ ce i n recent 
:philos0phi-ecl thot"t&h t . Otto and Barth both ho ld to the objectivi ·y of 
valu e . ]ri,;:·htma.n. 1 s t.l).ought r epresen ts a syn thesis of the subjectiv e and 
objective theories . 
Th e a:ppl. cation of the d:LalecticE,l me t.1od , decided upon i n the 
fi rst part of tl1e th esis , to tl1e evidence f ou.>1d i n the seco~d part reve.,..ls 
lar ge1· &"'1 d mo r e i nclu sive dialectic exists . Wtile it erribraces the 
t l1 oug: t of all the men studned it classes t hem all as -partial and onl y con-
tributa ry to t1ce lare;er w ole , a n cl_ points toward God. God is d.e:ined as t:1e 
S·u.prerne Cos .ic Person W-O creates , sustains , and controls all cos::-Ji c uroces~ 
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for e :e J.'ea lization of t be hitthe~'t po ssible ve.l ue . 
~1e attitude of' i)e lief is t he ~dninmm requireweD. t f or ~~1 e r!laintain-
t:-cn ce nf :religion . Descri:ptively , heoon1sy;l, or t .J.e st&.j.'tin!9.: ;:>o i n t for the 
cUsC1.l.ESi::m l1 !£L~r 1-:.e C"' l led :relig i ous . P"o r !t'!atively , tJ::.at is , relat e to t1e 
definition of Go d , !"e d.oni s~n iHJ.Y 'oe called. 11 rel i .;ious ske-p ti ci s 11. '1 Th e he-
donisn1 a.s r eiJreseT: teC:. by- Rus sel l , lOWeYe r . is found t 0 be incapabl e 0f sat-
peri ences sensntions c:.;:Ie_ f ro m tl1e:re is led to believe in physic .1 tl in.::; s 
as the source of val ue . 
Thus h e ::loa ism leads to naturalism. Bel t t~::.e na t uralist is C.riven to 
prc:.g:rnati sm b;Y: t~1 e e:l';:pe:ri en ced fac t that th i nc:; s have no v<~l·ue in t hehls e l ves 
but that only what is don e wtt:C1 thing s 11roduc e s value . Con sequence , then . 
1 ea. . to :pra~'l .a.t i sm. 
_ e pra giilatist:.. ho1'1ever , cannot find the source of val ue ic1ere ctiv-
:L ty . Sor ethint;: ~ us t act. Something &lso :::lls t <>~ppreciate t h< t action . T}1i s 
s oJ:et~'line:~ !!lUSt be Derson s . Values , then , are su1)jective . 
Here social values t'bc/c greatl 2.r enrich li f e c.r e :fou.r..d, and 1 "'~ny v;ho 101 
t h is vi ew are ten~ ted to sa~r , 11 Tl:i s r;mst Je the en o .. . •1 as do es .. . c. Otto . 
But ti1e hUJne.::1is t fiads ve .. lues objec ti ve r,c~:cen he ree,l i zes t ha t even social 
val ues c2 ..nnot e xist unl ess L .ere is something to sb.are . Tlm.s . the hurrenist 
find.s t~1.e o1J i < c t ivity o~~ values s t ill e.head of h :lm. ]lJ..t , a ll val u es must 
be al so sub ,i e c tive . That is a fe.ct of e:><:perience . How ce.n tb.A~r e ob j ec-
tive too? Thi s also is a fact of experience . 
L e neVI s~rn thesis is found i n theism v.rhicll hold.s t hat God is both 
persone.l and. no:rr;tative . Th e su:pe:mature .. l ist Barth says th t Gb i£ t ot<..ll:'r 
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other , a vieY' which eli:Idnates God1s person<:ility. The mystic R. tto , 
i'rho says there is no law in reli ~:ion , 'but that all is non- rat:honal e:JgJeri-
ence elir,:ina.'ces God's ficelit;y to norms . The coherence viev; e:x:yresse 6. b y 
Bri['htrt:c...n takes the tru.t~1 i n both views • J. ~n~o CC01Jll t . 
>.il l , wlich 
is the real izc:.tion of tile highest :pose-:L le value . To t his experience h e 
can now a dd hi~ will or belief or faith or co:mmitmen t . T :1e "''1tithesis , or 
the nor J;:ati ve cl.efini tion o·"' ::cel i t:: ion : l:eli ef in the vti l l of G0cl u.s · the 
:·lir·h e st ::)o s:::ble vsl ue together with its i rn~_)J.ications f or t _ e real i ;;; tion 
of indivio:~,;..z,l an d social values , l ogi cal l~,r fo llov;rs . The resulting s:;rnthesis 
is t h e ini t iation of spiritual life whi ch ts the result of h J. s 
relation with C+ od . Thus ertc:dn ty is achieved , no t absolute or theoretic 1 
certain ty , u t practical certai nty , - -the only door to theoretic 1 c ertainty . 
Ayer , Alfr ed J . --LTL 
LaniDJ,a,~e . Tru.tb p,no. Lor.·ic . 
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